“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 3 - 1 6
30th Bomb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher
report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947;
Combs interview.) There is some evi-
dence that several planes had been left
in an unusually exposed position. (Ind,
Butunn, p. 1 0 1 . ) Ft should be emphasized,
however, that the bombing did little
damage, and that the low-flying enemy
pursuits picked out the B-17’s wherever
they were and riddled them. Although
this fact does not excuse a lack of pre-
caution, it is nevertheless true that unless
the B-17’s could have been completely
hidden, the widest possible dispersal
would have made little difference.
53. See sources in n. 5 1 and Summary
of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954, where
“Nichols Field reports 1 2 casualties-4
serious, 3 killed.” The enemy had
planned a full-scale attack on the fields
near Manila, but weather restricted their
effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese
Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
54. See again sources in n. 51 and also
Fisher talk.
5 5 . Msg. #736, T A G to C G USAFFE,
7 Dec. 1941.
56. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Ind, Bataun, pp. I I 1-12.
57. Report by Lt. Col. S.M. Mellnik,
AA in the Philippines, Doc. 24, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11.
58. 19th Gp. Operations Record. But
see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941,
1100, where “C.O. Del Monte reported
that 16 B-17’s on way to Clark Field”
and in a garbled message indicated one
or more had turned back “with wounded
crew members.” The original plan for a
mission at dawn under Field Order No.
z (see Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550)
seems to have been changed by Field
Order No. 3, transmitted to “C.O.
Bomber Command, Clark Field” at 2356,
8 December.
59. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet.
60. Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
where under 0 2 2 0 appears this entry:
“P-40 off OZ:IOshould be in between
690
0 3 :0 ~ 3 :30. Lt. Mahoney pilot”; and
there follows under 0513: “Mahoney to
Brady-six transports off Vigan Bay-1 I
Naval vessels off Vigan.”
61. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; 19th
Gp. Operations Record; Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, Z I Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara,
n.d.; USSBS Intr. 331, Cap! Mitsugo
Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945. According to the
officer who took Marett’s place as com-
manding officer of the 34th Squadron, a
Japanese air raid resulted in the destruc-
tion of twelve P-36’s shortly after they
landed from the Vigan mission. (Brown
statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
0530, 0625 which notes that “8 B-17’s
loaded, left Clark for attack on vessels,
priority transports and landing parties,”
and 1 2 1 1 where “Grover reports 2nd
Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .so cal.
3 P-35’s were lost in the encounter
including sqdn commander at 09: 1 5 . One
transport blew up.”
62. This is the only loss which has
been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval
and Merchant Losses during World
W a r 11, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commission
[ JANACI.)
63. 19th Gp. Operations Record; GO
2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 15 Feb. 1942. USSBS reports
indicate that there were no aircraft
carriers or battleships involved in the
Vigan and Aparri landings. (See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
under 0925.)
64. 19th Gp. Operations Record.
65. Ltr., Col. E.L. Eubank to CG
FEAF, 19 Feb. 1942, Narrative Report
of Flight of Capt. Colin P. Kelly, Doc.
25 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11.
66. Zbid., msg., Manila to T A G , 1 1
Dec. 1941; msg., MacArthur to T A G ,
28 Dec. 1941; msg. #s, Java to TAG,
1 5 Feb. 1942; Summary of Activities, 10
Dec. 1941, 1700.
67. USSBS Intrs. 33, Vice Adm.
Kazutaka Shiraichi, 15 Oct. 1945; 90,