“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 3 - 1 6
30th Bomb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher
report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947;
Combs interview.) There is some evi-
dence that several planes had been left
in an unusually exposed position. (Ind,
Butunn, p. 1 0 1 . ) Ft should be emphasized,
however, that the bombing did little
damage, and that the low-flying enemy
pursuits picked out the B-17’s wherever
they were and riddled them. Although
this fact does not excuse a lack of pre-
caution, it is nevertheless true that unless
the B-17’s could have been completely
hidden, the widest possible dispersal
would have made little difference.
53. See sources in n. 5 1 and Summary
of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954, where
“Nichols Field reports 1 2 casualties-4
serious, 3 killed.” The enemy had
planned a full-scale attack on the fields
near Manila, but weather restricted their
effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese
Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
54. See again sources in n. 51 and also
Fisher talk.
5 5 . Msg. #736, T A G to C G USAFFE,
7 Dec. 1941.
56. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Ind, Bataun, pp. I I 1-12.
57. Report by Lt. Col. S.M. Mellnik,
AA in the Philippines, Doc. 24, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11.
58. 19th Gp. Operations Record. But
see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941,
1100, where “C.O. Del Monte reported
that 16 B-17’s on way to Clark Field”
and in a garbled message indicated one
or more had turned back “with wounded
crew members.” The original plan for a
mission at dawn under Field Order No.
z (see Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550)
seems to have been changed by Field
Order No. 3, transmitted to “C.O.
Bomber Command, Clark Field” at 2356,
8 December.
59. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet.
60. Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
where under 0 2 2 0 appears this entry:
“P-40 off OZ:IOshould be in between
690
0 3 :0 ~ 3 :30. Lt. Mahoney pilot”; and
there follows under 0513: “Mahoney to
Brady-six transports off Vigan Bay-1 I
Naval vessels off Vigan.”
61. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; 19th
Gp. Operations Record; Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, Z I Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara,
n.d.; USSBS Intr. 331, Cap! Mitsugo
Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945. According to the
officer who took Marett’s place as com-
manding officer of the 34th Squadron, a
Japanese air raid resulted in the destruc-
tion of twelve P-36’s shortly after they
landed from the Vigan mission. (Brown
statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
0530, 0625 which notes that “8 B-17’s
loaded, left Clark for attack on vessels,
priority transports and landing parties,”
and 1 2 1 1 where “Grover reports 2nd
Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .so cal.
3 P-35’s were lost in the encounter
including sqdn commander at 09: 1 5 . One
transport blew up.”
62. This is the only loss which has
been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval
and Merchant Losses during World
W a r 11, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commission
[ JANACI.)
63. 19th Gp. Operations Record; GO
2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 15 Feb. 1942. USSBS reports
indicate that there were no aircraft
carriers or battleships involved in the
Vigan and Aparri landings. (See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
under 0925.)
64. 19th Gp. Operations Record.
65. Ltr., Col. E.L. Eubank to CG
FEAF, 19 Feb. 1942, Narrative Report
of Flight of Capt. Colin P. Kelly, Doc.
25 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11.
66. Zbid., msg., Manila to T A G , 1 1
Dec. 1941; msg., MacArthur to T A G ,
28 Dec. 1941; msg. #s, Java to TAG,
1 5 Feb. 1942; Summary of Activities, 10
Dec. 1941, 1700.
67. USSBS Intrs. 33, Vice Adm.
Kazutaka Shiraichi, 15 Oct. 1945; 90,