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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 3 - 1 6
30th Bomb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher
report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947;
Combs interview.) There is some evi-
dence that several planes had been left
in an unusually exposed position. (Ind,
Butunn, p. 1 0 1 . ) Ft should be emphasized,
however, that the bombing did little
damage, and that the low-flying enemy
pursuits picked out the B-17’s wherever
they were and riddled them. Although
this fact does not excuse a lack of pre-
caution, it is nevertheless true that unless
the B-17’s could have been completely
hidden, the widest possible dispersal
would have made little difference.
53. See sources in n. 5 1 and Summary
of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954, where
“Nichols Field reports 1 2 casualties-4
serious, 3 killed.” The enemy had
planned a full-scale attack on the fields
near Manila, but weather restricted their
effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese
Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
54. See again sources in n. 51 and also
Fisher talk.
5 5 . Msg. #736, T A G to C G USAFFE,
7 Dec. 1941.
56. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Ind, Bataun, pp. I I 1-12.
57. Report by Lt. Col. S.M. Mellnik,
AA in the Philippines, Doc. 24, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11.
58. 19th Gp. Operations Record. But
see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941,
1100, where “C.O. Del Monte reported
that 16 B-17’s on way to Clark Field”
and in a garbled message indicated one
or more had turned back “with wounded
crew members.” The original plan for a
mission at dawn under Field Order No.
z (see Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550)
seems to have been changed by Field
Order No. 3, transmitted to “C.O.
Bomber Command, Clark Field” at 2356,
8 December.
59. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet.
60. Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
where under 0 2 2 0 appears this entry:
“P-40 off OZ:IOshould be in between
690
0 3 :0 ~ 3 :30. Lt. Mahoney pilot”; and
there follows under 0513: “Mahoney to
Brady-six transports off Vigan Bay-1 I
Naval vessels off Vigan.”
61. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; 19th
Gp. Operations Record; Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, Z I Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara,
n.d.; USSBS Intr. 331, Cap! Mitsugo
Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945. According to the
officer who took Marett’s place as com-
manding officer of the 34th Squadron, a
Japanese air raid resulted in the destruc-
tion of twelve P-36’s shortly after they
landed from the Vigan mission. (Brown
statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
0530, 0625 which notes that “8 B-17’s
loaded, left Clark for attack on vessels,
priority transports and landing parties,”
and 1 2 1 1 where “Grover reports 2nd
Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .so cal.
3 P-35’s were lost in the encounter
including sqdn commander at 09: 1 5 . One
transport blew up.”
62. This is the only loss which has
been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval
and Merchant Losses during World
W a r 11, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commission
[ JANACI.)
63. 19th Gp. Operations Record; GO
2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 15 Feb. 1942. USSBS reports
indicate that there were no aircraft
carriers or battleships involved in the
Vigan and Aparri landings. (See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
under 0925.)
64. 19th Gp. Operations Record.
65. Ltr., Col. E.L. Eubank to CG
FEAF, 19 Feb. 1942, Narrative Report
of Flight of Capt. Colin P. Kelly, Doc.
25 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11.
66. Zbid., msg., Manila to T A G , 1 1
Dec. 1941; msg., MacArthur to T A G ,
28 Dec. 1941; msg. #s, Java to TAG,
1 5 Feb. 1942; Summary of Activities, 10
Dec. 1941, 1700.
67. USSBS Intrs. 33, Vice Adm.
Kazutaka Shiraichi, 15 Oct. 1945; 90,

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