“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 1 - 1 3
history.) It should be noted that both
Colonel Fry’s and Major Heald’s state-
ments were made more than two years
after the events being described. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences in
time stated is that Tash’s B-17 was sent
to Clark Field merely to have certain
repairs made on his plane as is stated in
the 19th Group Operations Record, and
that the order received from Clark Field
was not related in any way to the out-
break of hostilities.
49. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; G O X I ,
Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Statement of Personal Experience, made
by Lt. Col. W.A. Sheppard and Maj.
E.B. Gilmore at the request of historical
personnel, I Feb. 1945; Ind, Bataan, pp.
103-4. See also n. 45 above.
50. GO 17, Hq. FEAF, 2 3 Feb. 1942;
G O 2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 48, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941; GO 5 2 , Hq.
Fifth Air Force, 18 Dec. 1942; Fisher
report; Brady interview, as in n. 25;
interview with Col. Cecil E. Combs by
author, 19 Jan. 1945; History, 19th Bomb.
Gp., App. A; Lt. Col. William J. Ken-
nard, Report on Philippine and Aus-
tralian Activities, 14 Nov. 1942; interview
with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland by
W.D. Edmonds, 4 June 1945.
5 1 . Fisher report; History, 24th Pur-
suit Gp.; msg. # 1 1 3 3 , Manila to WD,
8 Dec. 1941; msg. # 1 1 3 y , Manila to WD,
recd. 9 Dec. 1941; memo for S/W by
Spaatz, C/AS, 8 Dec. 1941; Robb, Shep-
pard and Gilmore, and Obert statements
(see n. 2 1 and n. 49); Ind, Bataan, pp.
102-6.
52. Available records of the two
squadrons, the 28th and 30th, which were
a t Clark on 8 December, state that the
B-17’s were “dispersed” at the time of
the attack. Col. W.P. Fisher, commander
of the 28th Squadron in December 1941,
has stated that it was standard opera-
tional procedure for his aircraft to go
to their assigned positions as soon as they
landed, and that they were dispersed on
this occasion. On the other hand, dis-
persal facilities had not been completed,
and it was impossible to provide com-
plete security from air attack. (History,
689
fifty-four “land attack planes” and thirty-
four fighters participated in the attack
on Clark, while an equal number of
bombers and fifty fighters struck at Iba.
(See Operations of the Japanese Navy
in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
46. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, p. 12; GO 48,
Hq. USAFFE, 2 1 Dec. 1941; statement,
as in n. 2 1 , of Maj. Stewart W. Robb,
formerly of 34th Sq. T h e flight leader
of the 34th Squadron states that its
eighteen P-35’~took to the air and pro-
ceeded to Clark Field without orders.
(Maj. Ben S. Brown statement, 2 5 Oct.
1944, in V Fighter Command docs.)
47. History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. B
(19th Gp. Operations Record). It will
be recalled that the B-17’s for several
days had been flying regular reconnais-
sance missions which had on occasion
taken them to within three miles of the
coast of Formosa. On this morning
Carpenter was patrolling the waters east
of Luzon. (Fisher interview, 17 June
1947; History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
48. 19th Gp. Operations Record; G O
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
On 18 April 1944, Col. R.L. Fry, who
was executive officer of the 5th Air Base
Group at Del Monte in December 1941,
made the following statement: “In re-
sponse to orders from Clark Field at 0400
hours 8th December, one B-17 under
Lieutenant Tash took off from Del
Monte at 0945 for Clark Field to have a
camera installed so that a photographic
mission could be flown over Formosa.”
(Doc. 8, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I, App. II.) This indicates that the order
from Clark Field was sent to Del Monte
immediately after word was received
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.
But it should be pointed out that Maj.
E.H. Heald, who in December 1941 had
helped to set up communications for the
5th Air Base Group, stated in May 1944
that “at the time of the attack upon the
Philippines” he received the “first mes-
sage radioed to Del Monte from General
Headquarters” at approximately 0630,
and that five minutes later another ar-
rived from Colonel Eubank. The first
message read: “Hostilities have begun.
All Airdromes alert.” (Doc. 17, same