“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 1 - 1 3
history.) It should be noted that both
Colonel Fry’s and Major Heald’s state-
ments were made more than two years
after the events being described. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences in
time stated is that Tash’s B-17 was sent
to Clark Field merely to have certain
repairs made on his plane as is stated in
the 19th Group Operations Record, and
that the order received from Clark Field
was not related in any way to the out-
break of hostilities.
49. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; G O X I ,
Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Statement of Personal Experience, made
by Lt. Col. W.A. Sheppard and Maj.
E.B. Gilmore at the request of historical
personnel, I Feb. 1945; Ind, Bataan, pp.
103-4. See also n. 45 above.
50. GO 17, Hq. FEAF, 2 3 Feb. 1942;
G O 2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 48, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941; GO 5 2 , Hq.
Fifth Air Force, 18 Dec. 1942; Fisher
report; Brady interview, as in n. 25;
interview with Col. Cecil E. Combs by
author, 19 Jan. 1945; History, 19th Bomb.
Gp., App. A; Lt. Col. William J. Ken-
nard, Report on Philippine and Aus-
tralian Activities, 14 Nov. 1942; interview
with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland by
W.D. Edmonds, 4 June 1945.
5 1 . Fisher report; History, 24th Pur-
suit Gp.; msg. # 1 1 3 3 , Manila to WD,
8 Dec. 1941; msg. # 1 1 3 y , Manila to WD,
recd. 9 Dec. 1941; memo for S/W by
Spaatz, C/AS, 8 Dec. 1941; Robb, Shep-
pard and Gilmore, and Obert statements
(see n. 2 1 and n. 49); Ind, Bataan, pp.
102-6.
52. Available records of the two
squadrons, the 28th and 30th, which were
a t Clark on 8 December, state that the
B-17’s were “dispersed” at the time of
the attack. Col. W.P. Fisher, commander
of the 28th Squadron in December 1941,
has stated that it was standard opera-
tional procedure for his aircraft to go
to their assigned positions as soon as they
landed, and that they were dispersed on
this occasion. On the other hand, dis-
persal facilities had not been completed,
and it was impossible to provide com-
plete security from air attack. (History,
689
fifty-four “land attack planes” and thirty-
four fighters participated in the attack
on Clark, while an equal number of
bombers and fifty fighters struck at Iba.
(See Operations of the Japanese Navy
in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
46. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, p. 12; GO 48,
Hq. USAFFE, 2 1 Dec. 1941; statement,
as in n. 2 1 , of Maj. Stewart W. Robb,
formerly of 34th Sq. T h e flight leader
of the 34th Squadron states that its
eighteen P-35’~took to the air and pro-
ceeded to Clark Field without orders.
(Maj. Ben S. Brown statement, 2 5 Oct.
1944, in V Fighter Command docs.)
47. History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. B
(19th Gp. Operations Record). It will
be recalled that the B-17’s for several
days had been flying regular reconnais-
sance missions which had on occasion
taken them to within three miles of the
coast of Formosa. On this morning
Carpenter was patrolling the waters east
of Luzon. (Fisher interview, 17 June
1947; History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
48. 19th Gp. Operations Record; G O
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
On 18 April 1944, Col. R.L. Fry, who
was executive officer of the 5th Air Base
Group at Del Monte in December 1941,
made the following statement: “In re-
sponse to orders from Clark Field at 0400
hours 8th December, one B-17 under
Lieutenant Tash took off from Del
Monte at 0945 for Clark Field to have a
camera installed so that a photographic
mission could be flown over Formosa.”
(Doc. 8, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I, App. II.) This indicates that the order
from Clark Field was sent to Del Monte
immediately after word was received
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.
But it should be pointed out that Maj.
E.H. Heald, who in December 1941 had
helped to set up communications for the
5th Air Base Group, stated in May 1944
that “at the time of the attack upon the
Philippines” he received the “first mes-
sage radioed to Del Monte from General
Headquarters” at approximately 0630,
and that five minutes later another ar-
rived from Colonel Eubank. The first
message read: “Hostilities have begun.
All Airdromes alert.” (Doc. 17, same