“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 1 - 1 3
history.) It should be noted that both
Colonel Fry’s and Major Heald’s state-
ments were made more than two years
after the events being described. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences in
time stated is that Tash’s B-17 was sent
to Clark Field merely to have certain
repairs made on his plane as is stated in
the 19th Group Operations Record, and
that the order received from Clark Field
was not related in any way to the out-
break of hostilities.
49. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; G O X I ,
Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Statement of Personal Experience, made
by Lt. Col. W.A. Sheppard and Maj.
E.B. Gilmore at the request of historical
personnel, I Feb. 1945; Ind, Bataan, pp.
103-4. See also n. 45 above.
50. GO 17, Hq. FEAF, 2 3 Feb. 1942;
G O 2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 48, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941; GO 5 2 , Hq.
Fifth Air Force, 18 Dec. 1942; Fisher
report; Brady interview, as in n. 25;
interview with Col. Cecil E. Combs by
author, 19 Jan. 1945; History, 19th Bomb.
Gp., App. A; Lt. Col. William J. Ken-
nard, Report on Philippine and Aus-
tralian Activities, 14 Nov. 1942; interview
with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland by
W.D. Edmonds, 4 June 1945.
5 1 . Fisher report; History, 24th Pur-
suit Gp.; msg. # 1 1 3 3 , Manila to WD,
8 Dec. 1941; msg. # 1 1 3 y , Manila to WD,
recd. 9 Dec. 1941; memo for S/W by
Spaatz, C/AS, 8 Dec. 1941; Robb, Shep-
pard and Gilmore, and Obert statements
(see n. 2 1 and n. 49); Ind, Bataan, pp.
102-6.
52. Available records of the two
squadrons, the 28th and 30th, which were
a t Clark on 8 December, state that the
B-17’s were “dispersed” at the time of
the attack. Col. W.P. Fisher, commander
of the 28th Squadron in December 1941,
has stated that it was standard opera-
tional procedure for his aircraft to go
to their assigned positions as soon as they
landed, and that they were dispersed on
this occasion. On the other hand, dis-
persal facilities had not been completed,
and it was impossible to provide com-
plete security from air attack. (History,
689
fifty-four “land attack planes” and thirty-
four fighters participated in the attack
on Clark, while an equal number of
bombers and fifty fighters struck at Iba.
(See Operations of the Japanese Navy
in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
46. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, p. 12; GO 48,
Hq. USAFFE, 2 1 Dec. 1941; statement,
as in n. 2 1 , of Maj. Stewart W. Robb,
formerly of 34th Sq. T h e flight leader
of the 34th Squadron states that its
eighteen P-35’~took to the air and pro-
ceeded to Clark Field without orders.
(Maj. Ben S. Brown statement, 2 5 Oct.
1944, in V Fighter Command docs.)
47. History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. B
(19th Gp. Operations Record). It will
be recalled that the B-17’s for several
days had been flying regular reconnais-
sance missions which had on occasion
taken them to within three miles of the
coast of Formosa. On this morning
Carpenter was patrolling the waters east
of Luzon. (Fisher interview, 17 June
1947; History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
48. 19th Gp. Operations Record; G O
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
On 18 April 1944, Col. R.L. Fry, who
was executive officer of the 5th Air Base
Group at Del Monte in December 1941,
made the following statement: “In re-
sponse to orders from Clark Field at 0400
hours 8th December, one B-17 under
Lieutenant Tash took off from Del
Monte at 0945 for Clark Field to have a
camera installed so that a photographic
mission could be flown over Formosa.”
(Doc. 8, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I, App. II.) This indicates that the order
from Clark Field was sent to Del Monte
immediately after word was received
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.
But it should be pointed out that Maj.
E.H. Heald, who in December 1941 had
helped to set up communications for the
5th Air Base Group, stated in May 1944
that “at the time of the attack upon the
Philippines” he received the “first mes-
sage radioed to Del Monte from General
Headquarters” at approximately 0630,
and that five minutes later another ar-
rived from Colonel Eubank. The first
message read: “Hostilities have begun.
All Airdromes alert.” (Doc. 17, same