The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 1 - 1 3
history.) It should be noted that both
Colonel Fry’s and Major Heald’s state-
ments were made more than two years
after the events being described. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences in
time stated is that Tash’s B-17 was sent
to Clark Field merely to have certain
repairs made on his plane as is stated in
the 19th Group Operations Record, and
that the order received from Clark Field
was not related in any way to the out-
break of hostilities.
49. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; G O X I ,
Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Statement of Personal Experience, made
by Lt. Col. W.A. Sheppard and Maj.
E.B. Gilmore at the request of historical
personnel, I Feb. 1945; Ind, Bataan, pp.
103-4. See also n. 45 above.
50. GO 17, Hq. FEAF, 2 3 Feb. 1942;
G O 2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 48, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941; GO 5 2 , Hq.
Fifth Air Force, 18 Dec. 1942; Fisher
report; Brady interview, as in n. 25;
interview with Col. Cecil E. Combs by
author, 19 Jan. 1945; History, 19th Bomb.
Gp., App. A; Lt. Col. William J. Ken-
nard, Report on Philippine and Aus-
tralian Activities, 14 Nov. 1942; interview
with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland by
W.D. Edmonds, 4 June 1945.
5 1 . Fisher report; History, 24th Pur-
suit Gp.; msg. # 1 1 3 3 , Manila to WD,
8 Dec. 1941; msg. # 1 1 3 y , Manila to WD,
recd. 9 Dec. 1941; memo for S/W by
Spaatz, C/AS, 8 Dec. 1941; Robb, Shep-
pard and Gilmore, and Obert statements
(see n. 2 1 and n. 49); Ind, Bataan, pp.
102-6.
52. Available records of the two
squadrons, the 28th and 30th, which were
a t Clark on 8 December, state that the
B-17’s were “dispersed” at the time of
the attack. Col. W.P. Fisher, commander
of the 28th Squadron in December 1941,
has stated that it was standard opera-
tional procedure for his aircraft to go
to their assigned positions as soon as they
landed, and that they were dispersed on
this occasion. On the other hand, dis-
persal facilities had not been completed,
and it was impossible to provide com-
plete security from air attack. (History,
689
fifty-four “land attack planes” and thirty-
four fighters participated in the attack
on Clark, while an equal number of
bombers and fifty fighters struck at Iba.
(See Operations of the Japanese Navy
in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
46. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, p. 12; GO 48,
Hq. USAFFE, 2 1 Dec. 1941; statement,
as in n. 2 1 , of Maj. Stewart W. Robb,
formerly of 34th Sq. T h e flight leader
of the 34th Squadron states that its
eighteen P-35’~took to the air and pro-
ceeded to Clark Field without orders.
(Maj. Ben S. Brown statement, 2 5 Oct.
1944, in V Fighter Command docs.)
47. History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. B
(19th Gp. Operations Record). It will
be recalled that the B-17’s for several
days had been flying regular reconnais-
sance missions which had on occasion
taken them to within three miles of the
coast of Formosa. On this morning
Carpenter was patrolling the waters east
of Luzon. (Fisher interview, 17 June
1947; History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
48. 19th Gp. Operations Record; G O
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
On 18 April 1944, Col. R.L. Fry, who
was executive officer of the 5th Air Base
Group at Del Monte in December 1941,
made the following statement: “In re-
sponse to orders from Clark Field at 0400
hours 8th December, one B-17 under
Lieutenant Tash took off from Del
Monte at 0945 for Clark Field to have a
camera installed so that a photographic
mission could be flown over Formosa.”
(Doc. 8, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I, App. II.) This indicates that the order
from Clark Field was sent to Del Monte
immediately after word was received
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.
But it should be pointed out that Maj.
E.H. Heald, who in December 1941 had
helped to set up communications for the
5th Air Base Group, stated in May 1944
that “at the time of the attack upon the
Philippines” he received the “first mes-
sage radioed to Del Monte from General
Headquarters” at approximately 0630,
and that five minutes later another ar-
rived from Colonel Eubank. The first
message read: “Hostilities have begun.
All Airdromes alert.” (Doc. 17, same