“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 6 - 1 1
we had decided upon; the orders were we
couldn’t attack until we were attacked;
that we could go out on photo reccos in
force (loaded with bombs) but were not
to use them unless attacked.” (Doc. 10,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App.
11.)
32. Other than General Brereton’s
accounts as given in answer to letter
from Colonel Paul, Chief, AAF His-
torical Office, 30 Jan. 1946, and T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 36ff., the most de-
tailed narrative is the history of the 24th
Pursuit Group. Fn an unrecorded inter-
view of some two hours’ duration with
the author on 7 December 1944, General
Brady in answer to specific questions
growing out of the author’s own re-
search gave further corroboration to the
essential details. Among other informa-
tion supplied, he called attention to a
report which he and Brereton had pre-
pared and forwarded to Washington, as
he recalled it, late in January or early in
February 1942. Unfortunately, an ex-
tended and intensive search through
AAF and War Department files failed to
locate a copy. In reply to a question
regarding this report, General Brereton
(see memo for Paul, 6 Aug. 1947) stated:
“I do not have a copy of the paper
referred to. I was informed that this
paper was in General Arnold’s own
secret files, presumably it had been
shown to the Chief of Staff. Whether it
is still in existence, I do not know.” (See
also Eubank interview; Fisher Report on
Philippine and Java Operations received
in spring of 1942; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , I I ff.)
33. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, where
the general recalls, as in his published
Diaries, that at this time he instructed
Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander
who had flown down from Clark Field,
to prepare for an operation against
Takao harbor with target priority for
enemy transports and warships and at
the same time to make ready three planes
for reconnaissance of airfields on
Formosa.
34. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
35. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; History,
30th Bomb. Sq.
688
36. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Sum-
mary of Activities, 8 Dec. 1941.
37. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 40-41. General
Brereton’s memo of 6 Aug. 1947 (cited
in note 31 above) indicates that authori-
zation for the reconnaissance mission to
Formosa may have been received as early
as 0800. With reference to a “second
conference” by telephone with Suther-
land at “approximately 8 a.m.,” Brereton
states that “reconnaissance missions were
authorized in this conversation,” but his
recollection in the same place that the
order to Eubank for a specific mission
of reconnaissance over Formosa was not
given until after 1000 tallies with his pre-
viously given account in T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 40, and in 1st ind., Brereton
to Paul.
38. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview; Fisher report, as cited in n. 32.
39. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
40. Interview with Col. A.H. Camp-
41. Ibid.
42. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
43. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, Air Historical
Office to C G Thirteenth AF, 17 July
1945), Maj. Gen. E. L. Eubank to C G
AAF, 5 Aug. 1947. See also, in support of
General Eubank’s statement, Fisher re-
port and talk, confirmed in an interview
with author, 17 June 1947; 1st ind.,
Brereton to Paul; History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; ltr., Col. A.W. Marriner, Dir. of
Communications to C G USAFIA, 2 Apr.
1942; Ind, Bataan, p. 99. Most of the
sources attribute the failure to a break-
down of communications. Thus the his-
tory of the 24th Pursuit Group states that
“at approximately I I :45 an unidentified
report was received of a bombardment
formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed
south,” but it adds “that communications
breakdown prevented proper identifica-
tion.’’ This view is not borne out by the
testimony of Colonel Campbell. (See
n. 40.)
44. USSBS Intrs. 424 and 601; Opera-
tions of the Japanese Navy in the Inva-
sion of the Philippines.
45. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Fisher
report. According to Japanese sources,
bell by author, 11 July 1947.