“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 6 - 1 1
we had decided upon; the orders were we
couldn’t attack until we were attacked;
that we could go out on photo reccos in
force (loaded with bombs) but were not
to use them unless attacked.” (Doc. 10,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App.
11.)
32. Other than General Brereton’s
accounts as given in answer to letter
from Colonel Paul, Chief, AAF His-
torical Office, 30 Jan. 1946, and T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 36ff., the most de-
tailed narrative is the history of the 24th
Pursuit Group. Fn an unrecorded inter-
view of some two hours’ duration with
the author on 7 December 1944, General
Brady in answer to specific questions
growing out of the author’s own re-
search gave further corroboration to the
essential details. Among other informa-
tion supplied, he called attention to a
report which he and Brereton had pre-
pared and forwarded to Washington, as
he recalled it, late in January or early in
February 1942. Unfortunately, an ex-
tended and intensive search through
AAF and War Department files failed to
locate a copy. In reply to a question
regarding this report, General Brereton
(see memo for Paul, 6 Aug. 1947) stated:
“I do not have a copy of the paper
referred to. I was informed that this
paper was in General Arnold’s own
secret files, presumably it had been
shown to the Chief of Staff. Whether it
is still in existence, I do not know.” (See
also Eubank interview; Fisher Report on
Philippine and Java Operations received
in spring of 1942; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , I I ff.)
33. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, where
the general recalls, as in his published
Diaries, that at this time he instructed
Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander
who had flown down from Clark Field,
to prepare for an operation against
Takao harbor with target priority for
enemy transports and warships and at
the same time to make ready three planes
for reconnaissance of airfields on
Formosa.
34. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
35. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; History,
30th Bomb. Sq.
688
36. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Sum-
mary of Activities, 8 Dec. 1941.
37. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 40-41. General
Brereton’s memo of 6 Aug. 1947 (cited
in note 31 above) indicates that authori-
zation for the reconnaissance mission to
Formosa may have been received as early
as 0800. With reference to a “second
conference” by telephone with Suther-
land at “approximately 8 a.m.,” Brereton
states that “reconnaissance missions were
authorized in this conversation,” but his
recollection in the same place that the
order to Eubank for a specific mission
of reconnaissance over Formosa was not
given until after 1000 tallies with his pre-
viously given account in T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 40, and in 1st ind., Brereton
to Paul.
38. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview; Fisher report, as cited in n. 32.
39. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
40. Interview with Col. A.H. Camp-
41. Ibid.
42. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
43. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, Air Historical
Office to C G Thirteenth AF, 17 July
1945), Maj. Gen. E. L. Eubank to C G
AAF, 5 Aug. 1947. See also, in support of
General Eubank’s statement, Fisher re-
port and talk, confirmed in an interview
with author, 17 June 1947; 1st ind.,
Brereton to Paul; History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; ltr., Col. A.W. Marriner, Dir. of
Communications to C G USAFIA, 2 Apr.
1942; Ind, Bataan, p. 99. Most of the
sources attribute the failure to a break-
down of communications. Thus the his-
tory of the 24th Pursuit Group states that
“at approximately I I :45 an unidentified
report was received of a bombardment
formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed
south,” but it adds “that communications
breakdown prevented proper identifica-
tion.’’ This view is not borne out by the
testimony of Colonel Campbell. (See
n. 40.)
44. USSBS Intrs. 424 and 601; Opera-
tions of the Japanese Navy in the Inva-
sion of the Philippines.
45. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Fisher
report. According to Japanese sources,
bell by author, 11 July 1947.