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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 6 - 1 1
we had decided upon; the orders were we
couldn’t attack until we were attacked;
that we could go out on photo reccos in
force (loaded with bombs) but were not
to use them unless attacked.” (Doc. 10,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App.
11.)
32. Other than General Brereton’s
accounts as given in answer to letter
from Colonel Paul, Chief, AAF His-
torical Office, 30 Jan. 1946, and T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 36ff., the most de-
tailed narrative is the history of the 24th
Pursuit Group. Fn an unrecorded inter-
view of some two hours’ duration with
the author on 7 December 1944, General
Brady in answer to specific questions
growing out of the author’s own re-
search gave further corroboration to the
essential details. Among other informa-
tion supplied, he called attention to a
report which he and Brereton had pre-
pared and forwarded to Washington, as
he recalled it, late in January or early in
February 1942. Unfortunately, an ex-
tended and intensive search through
AAF and War Department files failed to
locate a copy. In reply to a question
regarding this report, General Brereton
(see memo for Paul, 6 Aug. 1947) stated:
“I do not have a copy of the paper
referred to. I was informed that this
paper was in General Arnold’s own
secret files, presumably it had been
shown to the Chief of Staff. Whether it
is still in existence, I do not know.” (See
also Eubank interview; Fisher Report on
Philippine and Java Operations received
in spring of 1942; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , I I ff.)
33. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, where
the general recalls, as in his published
Diaries, that at this time he instructed
Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander
who had flown down from Clark Field,
to prepare for an operation against
Takao harbor with target priority for
enemy transports and warships and at
the same time to make ready three planes
for reconnaissance of airfields on
Formosa.
34. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
35. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; History,
30th Bomb. Sq.
688
36. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Sum-
mary of Activities, 8 Dec. 1941.
37. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 40-41. General
Brereton’s memo of 6 Aug. 1947 (cited
in note 31 above) indicates that authori-
zation for the reconnaissance mission to
Formosa may have been received as early
as 0800. With reference to a “second
conference” by telephone with Suther-
land at “approximately 8 a.m.,” Brereton
states that “reconnaissance missions were
authorized in this conversation,” but his
recollection in the same place that the
order to Eubank for a specific mission
of reconnaissance over Formosa was not
given until after 1000 tallies with his pre-
viously given account in T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 40, and in 1st ind., Brereton
to Paul.
38. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview; Fisher report, as cited in n. 32.
39. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
40. Interview with Col. A.H. Camp-
41. Ibid.
42. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
43. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, Air Historical
Office to C G Thirteenth AF, 17 July
1945), Maj. Gen. E. L. Eubank to C G
AAF, 5 Aug. 1947. See also, in support of
General Eubank’s statement, Fisher re-
port and talk, confirmed in an interview
with author, 17 June 1947; 1st ind.,
Brereton to Paul; History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; ltr., Col. A.W. Marriner, Dir. of
Communications to C G USAFIA, 2 Apr.
1942; Ind, Bataan, p. 99. Most of the
sources attribute the failure to a break-
down of communications. Thus the his-
tory of the 24th Pursuit Group states that
“at approximately I I :45 an unidentified
report was received of a bombardment
formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed
south,” but it adds “that communications
breakdown prevented proper identifica-
tion.’’ This view is not borne out by the
testimony of Colonel Campbell. (See
n. 40.)
44. USSBS Intrs. 424 and 601; Opera-
tions of the Japanese Navy in the Inva-
sion of the Philippines.
45. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Fisher
report. According to Japanese sources,
bell by author, 11 July 1947.

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