The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 6 - 1 1
we had decided upon; the orders were we
couldn’t attack until we were attacked;
that we could go out on photo reccos in
force (loaded with bombs) but were not
to use them unless attacked.” (Doc. 10,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App.
11.)
32. Other than General Brereton’s
accounts as given in answer to letter
from Colonel Paul, Chief, AAF His-
torical Office, 30 Jan. 1946, and T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 36ff., the most de-
tailed narrative is the history of the 24th
Pursuit Group. Fn an unrecorded inter-
view of some two hours’ duration with
the author on 7 December 1944, General
Brady in answer to specific questions
growing out of the author’s own re-
search gave further corroboration to the
essential details. Among other informa-
tion supplied, he called attention to a
report which he and Brereton had pre-
pared and forwarded to Washington, as
he recalled it, late in January or early in
February 1942. Unfortunately, an ex-
tended and intensive search through
AAF and War Department files failed to
locate a copy. In reply to a question
regarding this report, General Brereton
(see memo for Paul, 6 Aug. 1947) stated:
“I do not have a copy of the paper
referred to. I was informed that this
paper was in General Arnold’s own
secret files, presumably it had been
shown to the Chief of Staff. Whether it
is still in existence, I do not know.” (See
also Eubank interview; Fisher Report on
Philippine and Java Operations received
in spring of 1942; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , I I ff.)
33. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, where
the general recalls, as in his published
Diaries, that at this time he instructed
Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander
who had flown down from Clark Field,
to prepare for an operation against
Takao harbor with target priority for
enemy transports and warships and at
the same time to make ready three planes
for reconnaissance of airfields on
Formosa.
34. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
35. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; History,
30th Bomb. Sq.
688
36. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Sum-
mary of Activities, 8 Dec. 1941.
37. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; T h e
Brereton Diaries, pp. 40-41. General
Brereton’s memo of 6 Aug. 1947 (cited
in note 31 above) indicates that authori-
zation for the reconnaissance mission to
Formosa may have been received as early
as 0800. With reference to a “second
conference” by telephone with Suther-
land at “approximately 8 a.m.,” Brereton
states that “reconnaissance missions were
authorized in this conversation,” but his
recollection in the same place that the
order to Eubank for a specific mission
of reconnaissance over Formosa was not
given until after 1000 tallies with his pre-
viously given account in T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 40, and in 1st ind., Brereton
to Paul.
38. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview; Fisher report, as cited in n. 32.
39. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
40. Interview with Col. A.H. Camp-
41. Ibid.
42. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
43. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, Air Historical
Office to C G Thirteenth AF, 17 July
1945), Maj. Gen. E. L. Eubank to C G
AAF, 5 Aug. 1947. See also, in support of
General Eubank’s statement, Fisher re-
port and talk, confirmed in an interview
with author, 17 June 1947; 1st ind.,
Brereton to Paul; History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; ltr., Col. A.W. Marriner, Dir. of
Communications to C G USAFIA, 2 Apr.
1942; Ind, Bataan, p. 99. Most of the
sources attribute the failure to a break-
down of communications. Thus the his-
tory of the 24th Pursuit Group states that
“at approximately I I :45 an unidentified
report was received of a bombardment
formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed
south,” but it adds “that communications
breakdown prevented proper identifica-
tion.’’ This view is not borne out by the
testimony of Colonel Campbell. (See
n. 40.)
44. USSBS Intrs. 424 and 601; Opera-
tions of the Japanese Navy in the Inva-
sion of the Philippines.
45. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Fisher
report. According to Japanese sources,
bell by author, 11 July 1947.