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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 3 - 5 3 0 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Eubank and Brady interviews; talk by Colonel Fisher, as cited in n. 25; Ind, Butaan, pp. 89-94; ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd Still, 3 0 Nov. 1941. It is interesting to note that the Japanese apparently ex- pected an early attack on Formosa by the B-17’s. In an interrogation of 28 November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because of the delay in launching the Japanese attack it was greatly feared that Amer- ican aircraft would initiate the first at- tack. That fear, he declared, had been greatly increased at 0800 when an inter- cepted American broadcast indicated that such an attack was being considered and that the B-17’s would arrive over Formosa at 1010. 3 1 . Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947, in reply to memo for Brereton from Paul, 22 July 1947. While General Brereton was consulting with General Sutherland, a meeting of the air force staff was held at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On 6 April 1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth Air Force historian, put the followirig questions to Col. Harold Eads, who had attended that meeting on the morning of 8 December 1941: “ I . W h o held the following points of view (8 December 1941): (a) Strike at the Japs in Formosa with everything we had without delay? (b) Wait for an overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets of opportunity? (d) Send out one or two planes (B-17’s) for reconnaissance “2. What took place in the meeting with Colonel Brady before General Brereton arrived on the morning of 8 December q41? “ 3 . What took place after General Brereton arrived?” Colonel Eads answered these ques- tions as follows: “Everyone attending the meeting on the morning of 8 Decern- ber held the view propounded in para- graph ‘a.’ W e were getting ready to proceed on that basis. No one held views ‘b,’ ‘c,) and ‘d.’. ..As I recall it, when General Brereton arrived at the meeting, he said we could not carry out the plan only? 687 with Brig. Gen. Francis M. Brady by author, 7 Dec. 1944; talk by Col. W.P. Fisher, 20 Mar. 1942, in AAG 385, War- fare; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as cited in n. 20; Allison Ind, Bataan, the ludg- ment Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 89-94. See also n. 3 1 below. 26. Ind, Bataan, pp. 9 2 9 3 . Colonel Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an intelligence officer with the Far East Air Force, states that the objective folders were complete enough to make the mis- sion “a very far cry from the blind stab it would have had to be otherwise.” The American policy had been to avoid any “overt act,” and thus, while regular re- connaissance missions had on occasion taken our flyers to within three miles of the Formosan coast, no photographic mission over Formosa itself had been flown. (Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher by author, 17 June 1947; History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.) 2 7 . Brady interview. 28. Zbid.; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; but see entry from Summary of Activi- ties, Hq. Far East Air Force, quoted on p. 207. 29. A request of 27 May 1944 from the Fifth Air Force, initiated by the historian of that organization, to General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area for information from personnel holding key positions under General MacArthur at the outbreak of war undertook to supplement the record available in AAF files. Among other things, information was sought regarding prewar plans for the employment of the Far East Air Force, the possible effect of the political status of the Philippines on decisions not to assume the initiative against the Jap- anese after official confirmation of the Pearl Harbor attack had been received, and an indication of such orders as may have been issued to the air force on the morning of 8 December relating to the use of bombers based on Clark Field. The request was returned, however, with indorsement of 7 June 1944 as follows: “There is no official information in this headquarters bearing upon the questions propounded in basic communication.” (See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. XI.)
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