“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 3 - 5
3 0 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Eubank
and Brady interviews; talk by Colonel
Fisher, as cited in n. 25; Ind, Butaan, pp.
89-94; ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd
Still, 3 0 Nov. 1941. It is interesting to
note that the Japanese apparently ex-
pected an early attack on Formosa by
the B-17’s. In an interrogation of 28
November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr.
Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because
of the delay in launching the Japanese
attack it was greatly feared that Amer-
ican aircraft would initiate the first at-
tack. That fear, he declared, had been
greatly increased at 0800 when an inter-
cepted American broadcast indicated
that such an attack was being considered
and that the B-17’s would arrive over
Formosa at 1010.
3 1 . Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt.
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947, in
reply to memo for Brereton from Paul,
22 July 1947. While General Brereton
was consulting with General Sutherland,
a meeting of the air force staff was held
at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On
6 April 1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth
Air Force historian, put the followirig
questions to Col. Harold Eads, who had
attended that meeting on the morning
of 8 December 1941:
“ I . W h o held the following points of
view (8 December 1941): (a) Strike at
the Japs in Formosa with everything we
had without delay? (b) Wait for an
overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a
reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets
of opportunity? (d) Send out one or
two planes (B-17’s) for reconnaissance
“2. What took place in the meeting
with Colonel Brady before General
Brereton arrived on the morning of 8
December q41?
“ 3 . What took place after General
Brereton arrived?”
Colonel Eads answered these ques-
tions as follows: “Everyone attending
the meeting on the morning of 8 Decern-
ber held the view propounded in para-
graph ‘a.’ W e were getting ready to
proceed on that basis. No one held views
‘b,’ ‘c,) and ‘d.’. ..As I recall it, when
General Brereton arrived at the meeting,
he said we could not carry out the plan
only?
687
with Brig. Gen. Francis M. Brady by
author, 7 Dec. 1944; talk by Col. W.P.
Fisher, 20 Mar. 1942, in AAG 385, War-
fare; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as cited
in n. 20; Allison Ind, Bataan, the ludg-
ment Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 89-94.
See also n. 3 1 below.
26. Ind, Bataan, pp. 9 2 9 3 . Colonel
Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an
intelligence officer with the Far East Air
Force, states that the objective folders
were complete enough to make the mis-
sion “a very far cry from the blind stab
it would have had to be otherwise.” The
American policy had been to avoid any
“overt act,” and thus, while regular re-
connaissance missions had on occasion
taken our flyers to within three miles of
the Formosan coast, no photographic
mission over Formosa itself had been
flown. (Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher
by author, 17 June 1947; History, 19th
Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
2 7 . Brady interview.
28. Zbid.; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
but see entry from Summary of Activi-
ties, Hq. Far East Air Force, quoted on
p. 207.
29. A request of 27 May 1944 from
the Fifth Air Force, initiated by the
historian of that organization, to General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area
for information from personnel holding
key positions under General MacArthur
at the outbreak of war undertook to
supplement the record available in AAF
files. Among other things, information
was sought regarding prewar plans for
the employment of the Far East Air
Force, the possible effect of the political
status of the Philippines on decisions not
to assume the initiative against the Jap-
anese after official confirmation of the
Pearl Harbor attack had been received,
and an indication of such orders as may
have been issued to the air force on the
morning of 8 December relating to the
use of bombers based on Clark Field.
The request was returned, however, with
indorsement of 7 June 1944 as follows:
“There is no official information in this
headquarters bearing upon the questions
propounded in basic communication.”
(See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. XI.)