“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 3 - 5
3 0 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Eubank
and Brady interviews; talk by Colonel
Fisher, as cited in n. 25; Ind, Butaan, pp.
89-94; ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd
Still, 3 0 Nov. 1941. It is interesting to
note that the Japanese apparently ex-
pected an early attack on Formosa by
the B-17’s. In an interrogation of 28
November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr.
Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because
of the delay in launching the Japanese
attack it was greatly feared that Amer-
ican aircraft would initiate the first at-
tack. That fear, he declared, had been
greatly increased at 0800 when an inter-
cepted American broadcast indicated
that such an attack was being considered
and that the B-17’s would arrive over
Formosa at 1010.
3 1 . Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt.
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947, in
reply to memo for Brereton from Paul,
22 July 1947. While General Brereton
was consulting with General Sutherland,
a meeting of the air force staff was held
at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On
6 April 1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth
Air Force historian, put the followirig
questions to Col. Harold Eads, who had
attended that meeting on the morning
of 8 December 1941:
“ I . W h o held the following points of
view (8 December 1941): (a) Strike at
the Japs in Formosa with everything we
had without delay? (b) Wait for an
overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a
reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets
of opportunity? (d) Send out one or
two planes (B-17’s) for reconnaissance
“2. What took place in the meeting
with Colonel Brady before General
Brereton arrived on the morning of 8
December q41?
“ 3 . What took place after General
Brereton arrived?”
Colonel Eads answered these ques-
tions as follows: “Everyone attending
the meeting on the morning of 8 Decern-
ber held the view propounded in para-
graph ‘a.’ W e were getting ready to
proceed on that basis. No one held views
‘b,’ ‘c,) and ‘d.’. ..As I recall it, when
General Brereton arrived at the meeting,
he said we could not carry out the plan
only?
687
with Brig. Gen. Francis M. Brady by
author, 7 Dec. 1944; talk by Col. W.P.
Fisher, 20 Mar. 1942, in AAG 385, War-
fare; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as cited
in n. 20; Allison Ind, Bataan, the ludg-
ment Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 89-94.
See also n. 3 1 below.
26. Ind, Bataan, pp. 9 2 9 3 . Colonel
Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an
intelligence officer with the Far East Air
Force, states that the objective folders
were complete enough to make the mis-
sion “a very far cry from the blind stab
it would have had to be otherwise.” The
American policy had been to avoid any
“overt act,” and thus, while regular re-
connaissance missions had on occasion
taken our flyers to within three miles of
the Formosan coast, no photographic
mission over Formosa itself had been
flown. (Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher
by author, 17 June 1947; History, 19th
Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
2 7 . Brady interview.
28. Zbid.; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
but see entry from Summary of Activi-
ties, Hq. Far East Air Force, quoted on
p. 207.
29. A request of 27 May 1944 from
the Fifth Air Force, initiated by the
historian of that organization, to General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area
for information from personnel holding
key positions under General MacArthur
at the outbreak of war undertook to
supplement the record available in AAF
files. Among other things, information
was sought regarding prewar plans for
the employment of the Far East Air
Force, the possible effect of the political
status of the Philippines on decisions not
to assume the initiative against the Jap-
anese after official confirmation of the
Pearl Harbor attack had been received,
and an indication of such orders as may
have been issued to the air force on the
morning of 8 December relating to the
use of bombers based on Clark Field.
The request was returned, however, with
indorsement of 7 June 1944 as follows:
“There is no official information in this
headquarters bearing upon the questions
propounded in basic communication.”
(See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. XI.)