“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 3 - 5
3 0 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Eubank
and Brady interviews; talk by Colonel
Fisher, as cited in n. 25; Ind, Butaan, pp.
89-94; ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd
Still, 3 0 Nov. 1941. It is interesting to
note that the Japanese apparently ex-
pected an early attack on Formosa by
the B-17’s. In an interrogation of 28
November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr.
Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because
of the delay in launching the Japanese
attack it was greatly feared that Amer-
ican aircraft would initiate the first at-
tack. That fear, he declared, had been
greatly increased at 0800 when an inter-
cepted American broadcast indicated
that such an attack was being considered
and that the B-17’s would arrive over
Formosa at 1010.
3 1 . Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt.
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947, in
reply to memo for Brereton from Paul,
22 July 1947. While General Brereton
was consulting with General Sutherland,
a meeting of the air force staff was held
at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On
6 April 1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth
Air Force historian, put the followirig
questions to Col. Harold Eads, who had
attended that meeting on the morning
of 8 December 1941:
“ I . W h o held the following points of
view (8 December 1941): (a) Strike at
the Japs in Formosa with everything we
had without delay? (b) Wait for an
overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a
reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets
of opportunity? (d) Send out one or
two planes (B-17’s) for reconnaissance
“2. What took place in the meeting
with Colonel Brady before General
Brereton arrived on the morning of 8
December q41?
“ 3 . What took place after General
Brereton arrived?”
Colonel Eads answered these ques-
tions as follows: “Everyone attending
the meeting on the morning of 8 Decern-
ber held the view propounded in para-
graph ‘a.’ W e were getting ready to
proceed on that basis. No one held views
‘b,’ ‘c,) and ‘d.’. ..As I recall it, when
General Brereton arrived at the meeting,
he said we could not carry out the plan
only?
687
with Brig. Gen. Francis M. Brady by
author, 7 Dec. 1944; talk by Col. W.P.
Fisher, 20 Mar. 1942, in AAG 385, War-
fare; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as cited
in n. 20; Allison Ind, Bataan, the ludg-
ment Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 89-94.
See also n. 3 1 below.
26. Ind, Bataan, pp. 9 2 9 3 . Colonel
Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an
intelligence officer with the Far East Air
Force, states that the objective folders
were complete enough to make the mis-
sion “a very far cry from the blind stab
it would have had to be otherwise.” The
American policy had been to avoid any
“overt act,” and thus, while regular re-
connaissance missions had on occasion
taken our flyers to within three miles of
the Formosan coast, no photographic
mission over Formosa itself had been
flown. (Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher
by author, 17 June 1947; History, 19th
Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
2 7 . Brady interview.
28. Zbid.; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
but see entry from Summary of Activi-
ties, Hq. Far East Air Force, quoted on
p. 207.
29. A request of 27 May 1944 from
the Fifth Air Force, initiated by the
historian of that organization, to General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area
for information from personnel holding
key positions under General MacArthur
at the outbreak of war undertook to
supplement the record available in AAF
files. Among other things, information
was sought regarding prewar plans for
the employment of the Far East Air
Force, the possible effect of the political
status of the Philippines on decisions not
to assume the initiative against the Jap-
anese after official confirmation of the
Pearl Harbor attack had been received,
and an indication of such orders as may
have been issued to the air force on the
morning of 8 December relating to the
use of bombers based on Clark Field.
The request was returned, however, with
indorsement of 7 June 1944 as follows:
“There is no official information in this
headquarters bearing upon the questions
propounded in basic communication.”
(See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. XI.)