“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 3 - 5
3 0 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul; Eubank
and Brady interviews; talk by Colonel
Fisher, as cited in n. 25; Ind, Butaan, pp.
89-94; ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd
Still, 3 0 Nov. 1941. It is interesting to
note that the Japanese apparently ex-
pected an early attack on Formosa by
the B-17’s. In an interrogation of 28
November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr.
Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because
of the delay in launching the Japanese
attack it was greatly feared that Amer-
ican aircraft would initiate the first at-
tack. That fear, he declared, had been
greatly increased at 0800 when an inter-
cepted American broadcast indicated
that such an attack was being considered
and that the B-17’s would arrive over
Formosa at 1010.
3 1 . Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt.
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947, in
reply to memo for Brereton from Paul,
22 July 1947. While General Brereton
was consulting with General Sutherland,
a meeting of the air force staff was held
at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On
6 April 1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth
Air Force historian, put the followirig
questions to Col. Harold Eads, who had
attended that meeting on the morning
of 8 December 1941:
“ I . W h o held the following points of
view (8 December 1941): (a) Strike at
the Japs in Formosa with everything we
had without delay? (b) Wait for an
overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a
reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets
of opportunity? (d) Send out one or
two planes (B-17’s) for reconnaissance
“2. What took place in the meeting
with Colonel Brady before General
Brereton arrived on the morning of 8
December q41?
“ 3 . What took place after General
Brereton arrived?”
Colonel Eads answered these ques-
tions as follows: “Everyone attending
the meeting on the morning of 8 Decern-
ber held the view propounded in para-
graph ‘a.’ W e were getting ready to
proceed on that basis. No one held views
‘b,’ ‘c,) and ‘d.’. ..As I recall it, when
General Brereton arrived at the meeting,
he said we could not carry out the plan
only?
687
with Brig. Gen. Francis M. Brady by
author, 7 Dec. 1944; talk by Col. W.P.
Fisher, 20 Mar. 1942, in AAG 385, War-
fare; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as cited
in n. 20; Allison Ind, Bataan, the ludg-
ment Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 89-94.
See also n. 3 1 below.
26. Ind, Bataan, pp. 9 2 9 3 . Colonel
Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an
intelligence officer with the Far East Air
Force, states that the objective folders
were complete enough to make the mis-
sion “a very far cry from the blind stab
it would have had to be otherwise.” The
American policy had been to avoid any
“overt act,” and thus, while regular re-
connaissance missions had on occasion
taken our flyers to within three miles of
the Formosan coast, no photographic
mission over Formosa itself had been
flown. (Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher
by author, 17 June 1947; History, 19th
Bomb. Gp., App. A.)
2 7 . Brady interview.
28. Zbid.; 1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
but see entry from Summary of Activi-
ties, Hq. Far East Air Force, quoted on
p. 207.
29. A request of 27 May 1944 from
the Fifth Air Force, initiated by the
historian of that organization, to General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area
for information from personnel holding
key positions under General MacArthur
at the outbreak of war undertook to
supplement the record available in AAF
files. Among other things, information
was sought regarding prewar plans for
the employment of the Far East Air
Force, the possible effect of the political
status of the Philippines on decisions not
to assume the initiative against the Jap-
anese after official confirmation of the
Pearl Harbor attack had been received,
and an indication of such orders as may
have been issued to the air force on the
morning of 8 December relating to the
use of bombers based on Clark Field.
The request was returned, however, with
indorsement of 7 June 1944 as follows:
“There is no official information in this
headquarters bearing upon the questions
propounded in basic communication.”
(See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. XI.)