“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 7 - 2 0 3
describes the attack as having been made
in three waves rather than two. The
operations order and interrogation of
participating personnel indicate that the
actual attack was launched in two waves.
(See Hem-ngs . .. Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22 and Exh. 8-C,
4 ~ 6 2 7 ; USSBS herrogations I 13 and
603.) The R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor At-
tack, p. 58, gives a slightly different
breakdown of the number of planes ern-
ployed, with the following totals: 81
fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal
bombers, and 40 torpedo planes.
5 . R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 138-40; Walter Karig et al., Battle
Report (New York, 1944)~I, 12-17; ltr.,
Brig. Gen. H.C. Davidson to CG Hawai-
ian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941, in History,
VII Fighter Command; AAF Historical
Study No. 41, Operational History of the
Seventh Air Force, 7 Dec. 1941-6 Nov.
1943.
6. Battle Report, pp. 28-38; USSBS
Intrs. 65, 113, and 479.
7. R e p o r t . ..Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 64, 69. See also Battle Report, pp. 93-
96 and Plate XV. The additional loss of
five incoming planes from the carrier
Enterprise brought the total loss of naval
aircraft to ninety-two, and to this figure
were added at least thirty planes badly
damaged.
8. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
62; AAFHS-41.
9. AAFHS-41.
10. Zbid.; ltr., Gen. Davidson to C G
Hawaiian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941. See
also citations of the pilots mentioned.
1 1 . Records of tel. conversations in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study IV-I,
Processing and Ferrying Functions, 1941,
Vol. 11, Docs. 42-66; Histories, 19th
Bomb. Gp. and 435th Bomb. Sq.; 435th
[Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas.
12. AAFHS-41, especially App. 3,
W a r Diary kept by A-3, Hawaiian Air
Force, 7-31 Dec. 1941.
13. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
p. 141.
14. USSBS Intrs. 65, 113, and 479;
Hearings.. .Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 13,
Exh. 8 4 , 426-27.
686
15. Memo for Roberts Commission
by Hq. Hawaiian Air Force, 26 Dec.
1941, in AAFHS-41, App. z. See also p.
6. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 65,
states: “A total of 96 Army planes were
lost as a result of enemy action, this fig-
ure including aircraft destroyed in depots
and those damaged planes which were
subsequently stripped for parts.”
16. AAFHS-41, pp. 5-6; Hearings.. .
Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 1 2 , 325, lists
Army casualties as follows: killed in ac-
tion 194, wounded in action 360, missing
in action 2 2 , died nonbattle 2 , declared
dead I, and died of wounds 2 1 , for a
total of 600.
17. USSBS Intrs. 113 and 603; Report
...Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 64, suggests
that the presence of US. Naval Task
Force I Z south of Midway was probably
the deciding factor.
18. USSBS Intrs. 503, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945; 424,
Capt. Bunzo Shibata, 18 Nov. 1945; and
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
‘945.
19. USSBS Intr. 74, Capt. Chihaya
Takahashi, 20 Oct. 1945; USSBS, Sum-
mary Report (Pacific W a r ) , I July 1946.
20. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF His-
torical Office to C G Third Air Force,
30 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; History,
Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, Pt.
I, Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, 8-9.
2 1 . History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, pp. 8-9; History,
24th Pursuit Gp.; Statement of Personal
Experience, made by Maj. Stewart W.
Robb at the request of historical per-
sonnel, 30 Nov. 1944; statement by Maj.
David L. Obert, 14 May 1945.
22. USSBS Intr. 601, 2 8 Nov. 1945,
Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura, who during
the invasion of the Celebes was air op-
erations officer of the 23d Air Flotilla;
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the
Invasion of the Philippines, 15 May 1946,
ATIS Doc. 1 9 6 9 2 .
23. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
24. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
24th Pursuit Gp.
25. Interview with Col. Eugene Eu-
bank, 2 July 1942; unrecorded interview