“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 7 - 2 0 3
describes the attack as having been made
in three waves rather than two. The
operations order and interrogation of
participating personnel indicate that the
actual attack was launched in two waves.
(See Hem-ngs . .. Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22 and Exh. 8-C,
4 ~ 6 2 7 ; USSBS herrogations I 13 and
603.) The R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor At-
tack, p. 58, gives a slightly different
breakdown of the number of planes ern-
ployed, with the following totals: 81
fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal
bombers, and 40 torpedo planes.
5 . R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 138-40; Walter Karig et al., Battle
Report (New York, 1944)~I, 12-17; ltr.,
Brig. Gen. H.C. Davidson to CG Hawai-
ian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941, in History,
VII Fighter Command; AAF Historical
Study No. 41, Operational History of the
Seventh Air Force, 7 Dec. 1941-6 Nov.
1943.
6. Battle Report, pp. 28-38; USSBS
Intrs. 65, 113, and 479.
7. R e p o r t . ..Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 64, 69. See also Battle Report, pp. 93-
96 and Plate XV. The additional loss of
five incoming planes from the carrier
Enterprise brought the total loss of naval
aircraft to ninety-two, and to this figure
were added at least thirty planes badly
damaged.
8. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
62; AAFHS-41.
9. AAFHS-41.
10. Zbid.; ltr., Gen. Davidson to C G
Hawaiian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941. See
also citations of the pilots mentioned.
1 1 . Records of tel. conversations in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study IV-I,
Processing and Ferrying Functions, 1941,
Vol. 11, Docs. 42-66; Histories, 19th
Bomb. Gp. and 435th Bomb. Sq.; 435th
[Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas.
12. AAFHS-41, especially App. 3,
W a r Diary kept by A-3, Hawaiian Air
Force, 7-31 Dec. 1941.
13. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
p. 141.
14. USSBS Intrs. 65, 113, and 479;
Hearings.. .Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 13,
Exh. 8 4 , 426-27.
686
15. Memo for Roberts Commission
by Hq. Hawaiian Air Force, 26 Dec.
1941, in AAFHS-41, App. z. See also p.
6. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 65,
states: “A total of 96 Army planes were
lost as a result of enemy action, this fig-
ure including aircraft destroyed in depots
and those damaged planes which were
subsequently stripped for parts.”
16. AAFHS-41, pp. 5-6; Hearings.. .
Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 1 2 , 325, lists
Army casualties as follows: killed in ac-
tion 194, wounded in action 360, missing
in action 2 2 , died nonbattle 2 , declared
dead I, and died of wounds 2 1 , for a
total of 600.
17. USSBS Intrs. 113 and 603; Report
...Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 64, suggests
that the presence of US. Naval Task
Force I Z south of Midway was probably
the deciding factor.
18. USSBS Intrs. 503, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945; 424,
Capt. Bunzo Shibata, 18 Nov. 1945; and
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
‘945.
19. USSBS Intr. 74, Capt. Chihaya
Takahashi, 20 Oct. 1945; USSBS, Sum-
mary Report (Pacific W a r ) , I July 1946.
20. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF His-
torical Office to C G Third Air Force,
30 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; History,
Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, Pt.
I, Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, 8-9.
2 1 . History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, pp. 8-9; History,
24th Pursuit Gp.; Statement of Personal
Experience, made by Maj. Stewart W.
Robb at the request of historical per-
sonnel, 30 Nov. 1944; statement by Maj.
David L. Obert, 14 May 1945.
22. USSBS Intr. 601, 2 8 Nov. 1945,
Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura, who during
the invasion of the Celebes was air op-
erations officer of the 23d Air Flotilla;
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the
Invasion of the Philippines, 15 May 1946,
ATIS Doc. 1 9 6 9 2 .
23. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
24. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
24th Pursuit Gp.
25. Interview with Col. Eugene Eu-
bank, 2 July 1942; unrecorded interview