“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 7 - 2 0 3
describes the attack as having been made
in three waves rather than two. The
operations order and interrogation of
participating personnel indicate that the
actual attack was launched in two waves.
(See Hem-ngs . .. Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22 and Exh. 8-C,
4 ~ 6 2 7 ; USSBS herrogations I 13 and
603.) The R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor At-
tack, p. 58, gives a slightly different
breakdown of the number of planes ern-
ployed, with the following totals: 81
fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal
bombers, and 40 torpedo planes.
5 . R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 138-40; Walter Karig et al., Battle
Report (New York, 1944)~I, 12-17; ltr.,
Brig. Gen. H.C. Davidson to CG Hawai-
ian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941, in History,
VII Fighter Command; AAF Historical
Study No. 41, Operational History of the
Seventh Air Force, 7 Dec. 1941-6 Nov.
1943.
6. Battle Report, pp. 28-38; USSBS
Intrs. 65, 113, and 479.
7. R e p o r t . ..Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 64, 69. See also Battle Report, pp. 93-
96 and Plate XV. The additional loss of
five incoming planes from the carrier
Enterprise brought the total loss of naval
aircraft to ninety-two, and to this figure
were added at least thirty planes badly
damaged.
8. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
62; AAFHS-41.
9. AAFHS-41.
10. Zbid.; ltr., Gen. Davidson to C G
Hawaiian Air Force, 18 Dec. 1941. See
also citations of the pilots mentioned.
1 1 . Records of tel. conversations in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study IV-I,
Processing and Ferrying Functions, 1941,
Vol. 11, Docs. 42-66; Histories, 19th
Bomb. Gp. and 435th Bomb. Sq.; 435th
[Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas.
12. AAFHS-41, especially App. 3,
W a r Diary kept by A-3, Hawaiian Air
Force, 7-31 Dec. 1941.
13. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack,
p. 141.
14. USSBS Intrs. 65, 113, and 479;
Hearings.. .Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 13,
Exh. 8 4 , 426-27.
686
15. Memo for Roberts Commission
by Hq. Hawaiian Air Force, 26 Dec.
1941, in AAFHS-41, App. z. See also p.
6. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 65,
states: “A total of 96 Army planes were
lost as a result of enemy action, this fig-
ure including aircraft destroyed in depots
and those damaged planes which were
subsequently stripped for parts.”
16. AAFHS-41, pp. 5-6; Hearings.. .
Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 1 2 , 325, lists
Army casualties as follows: killed in ac-
tion 194, wounded in action 360, missing
in action 2 2 , died nonbattle 2 , declared
dead I, and died of wounds 2 1 , for a
total of 600.
17. USSBS Intrs. 113 and 603; Report
...Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 64, suggests
that the presence of US. Naval Task
Force I Z south of Midway was probably
the deciding factor.
18. USSBS Intrs. 503, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945; 424,
Capt. Bunzo Shibata, 18 Nov. 1945; and
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
‘945.
19. USSBS Intr. 74, Capt. Chihaya
Takahashi, 20 Oct. 1945; USSBS, Sum-
mary Report (Pacific W a r ) , I July 1946.
20. 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF His-
torical Office to C G Third Air Force,
30 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; History,
Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, Pt.
I, Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, 8-9.
2 1 . History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
Dec. 1941-Aug. 1942, pp. 8-9; History,
24th Pursuit Gp.; Statement of Personal
Experience, made by Maj. Stewart W.
Robb at the request of historical per-
sonnel, 30 Nov. 1944; statement by Maj.
David L. Obert, 14 May 1945.
22. USSBS Intr. 601, 2 8 Nov. 1945,
Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura, who during
the invasion of the Celebes was air op-
erations officer of the 23d Air Flotilla;
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the
Invasion of the Philippines, 15 May 1946,
ATIS Doc. 1 9 6 9 2 .
23. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
24. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
24th Pursuit Gp.
25. Interview with Col. Eugene Eu-
bank, 2 July 1942; unrecorded interview