“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 8 7 - 9 6
MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov. 1941;
unrecorded interview with Col. Cecil E.
Combs by Maj. R.L. Watson, 19 Jan.
'945.
99. Ltr., MacArthur to Marshall, 29
Nov. 1941; 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF
Historical Office to CG Third Air Force,
50 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview, as in n. 98; statement of Col.
R.L. Fry, 5th Air Base Gp., 18 Apr. 1944,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 8.
100. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Brady interview; Elsmore state-
ment, as in n. 98; Fry statement, as in
n. 99; interview with Maj. E.H. Heald,
communications officer, V Air Force
Service Command, 1 5 May 1944, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11,
Doc. 17.
101. Brady interview; A G 370.5 ( I *
15-41)
1941; A G 370.5
MC-C-M to C G AFCC, 2 2 Oct.
(10-27-41) MC-C-M to
C G AFCC, 30 Oct. 1941; Fourth Air
Force Historical Study IV-I, Vol. 11,
Docs. 42-66; Lt. Rob Roy Carruthers, in
435th [Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas, in History,
19th Bomb. Gp.; History of USAFIA,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 26; History, 7th Bomb. Gp.,
1942; AAFRH-11, pp. 34, 84-85; AAF
Historical Study No. 9, The AAF in
Australia to the Summer of 1942, pp.
1 0 2 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Elsniore statement, as in n. 98;
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 8 9 .
103. AAFRH-11, pp. 39-41; tel. con-
versations, 26, 27, 29 Nov. and 3, 4 Dec.
1941, in Fourth Air Force Historical
104. Statement of Sec. of War Stim-
son to Pearl Harbor lnvestigating Com-
mittee, N e w Y o r k Times, 2 2 Mar. 1946.
105. Report of the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack (79th Cong., zd sess.), Doc. 244,
p. 102.
106. Msg. #624, Marshall to CG
USAFFE, 27 NOV.1941.
107. Ltr., Hart to MacArthur, 2 3 Oct.
1941; ltr., MacArthur to Hart, 7 Nov.
194'.
11-12.
Study IV-I, Vol. 11, DOCS.42-46.
108. AAFRH-11, pp. 42-43; msg.
#1oo4, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Nov.
1941; Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to
War, and from 8 Dec. 1941 to 1 7 Feb.
1942; Col. W.P. Fisher, Report on Philip-
pine and Java Operations (n.d. but some-
time during spring of 1942) ; Brady inter-
view; History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11, Doc. 82.
109. USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
'945.
1 1 0 . History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
I I I . Msg. # 1 1 0 5 , MacArthur to
1 1 2 . AAFRH-11, pp. 4p-50, 85.
1 1 3 . Ibid., p. 85; AAFH%, pp. 11-12.
114. Fourth Air Force Historical
1 1 5 . Ltr., Short to Arnold, 6 Dec.
116. Ibid., pp. 5 ~ 6 2 ,88 (n. 17).
117. Ltr., Arnold to Martin, I Dec.
118. Fourth Air Force Historical
119. AAF in the W a r against Japan,
AGWAR, 6 Dec. 1941.
Study, IV-I, Vol. I.
1941,cited in AAFHS-45, p. 62.
'94'.
Study IV-I, Vol. I.
I941-1942, p. 2 .
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
I . Peace and W a r : US. Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941, pp. 136-48 and sup-
porting documents; Report of t h e Joint
Committee on the Investigation of t h e
Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Cong., zd
sess.), Doc. 244, pp. 1-49.
2 . R e p o r t . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 53-57; USSBS Interrogation No.
65, Capt. Y. Watanabe, 1 5 Oct. 1945; No.
1 1 3 , Capt. M. Fuchido, 10 Oct. 1945; No.
479, Capt. &I. Genda, 28-29 Nov. 1945;
No. 603, Capt. M. Fuchido, 28 Nov. 1945.
3. Interrogations cited in n. 2 ; Hear-
ings before the Joint Committee on the
Investigation. of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22.
4. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
57, which apparently regards an earlier
reconnaissance flight as a separate wave,
685