“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 8 7 - 9 6
MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov. 1941;
unrecorded interview with Col. Cecil E.
Combs by Maj. R.L. Watson, 19 Jan.
'945.
99. Ltr., MacArthur to Marshall, 29
Nov. 1941; 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF
Historical Office to CG Third Air Force,
50 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview, as in n. 98; statement of Col.
R.L. Fry, 5th Air Base Gp., 18 Apr. 1944,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 8.
100. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Brady interview; Elsmore state-
ment, as in n. 98; Fry statement, as in
n. 99; interview with Maj. E.H. Heald,
communications officer, V Air Force
Service Command, 1 5 May 1944, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11,
Doc. 17.
101. Brady interview; A G 370.5 ( I *
15-41)
1941; A G 370.5
MC-C-M to C G AFCC, 2 2 Oct.
(10-27-41) MC-C-M to
C G AFCC, 30 Oct. 1941; Fourth Air
Force Historical Study IV-I, Vol. 11,
Docs. 42-66; Lt. Rob Roy Carruthers, in
435th [Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas, in History,
19th Bomb. Gp.; History of USAFIA,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 26; History, 7th Bomb. Gp.,
1942; AAFRH-11, pp. 34, 84-85; AAF
Historical Study No. 9, The AAF in
Australia to the Summer of 1942, pp.
1 0 2 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Elsniore statement, as in n. 98;
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 8 9 .
103. AAFRH-11, pp. 39-41; tel. con-
versations, 26, 27, 29 Nov. and 3, 4 Dec.
1941, in Fourth Air Force Historical
104. Statement of Sec. of War Stim-
son to Pearl Harbor lnvestigating Com-
mittee, N e w Y o r k Times, 2 2 Mar. 1946.
105. Report of the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack (79th Cong., zd sess.), Doc. 244,
p. 102.
106. Msg. #624, Marshall to CG
USAFFE, 27 NOV.1941.
107. Ltr., Hart to MacArthur, 2 3 Oct.
1941; ltr., MacArthur to Hart, 7 Nov.
194'.
11-12.
Study IV-I, Vol. 11, DOCS.42-46.
108. AAFRH-11, pp. 42-43; msg.
#1oo4, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Nov.
1941; Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to
War, and from 8 Dec. 1941 to 1 7 Feb.
1942; Col. W.P. Fisher, Report on Philip-
pine and Java Operations (n.d. but some-
time during spring of 1942) ; Brady inter-
view; History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11, Doc. 82.
109. USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
'945.
1 1 0 . History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
I I I . Msg. # 1 1 0 5 , MacArthur to
1 1 2 . AAFRH-11, pp. 4p-50, 85.
1 1 3 . Ibid., p. 85; AAFH%, pp. 11-12.
114. Fourth Air Force Historical
1 1 5 . Ltr., Short to Arnold, 6 Dec.
116. Ibid., pp. 5 ~ 6 2 ,88 (n. 17).
117. Ltr., Arnold to Martin, I Dec.
118. Fourth Air Force Historical
119. AAF in the W a r against Japan,
AGWAR, 6 Dec. 1941.
Study, IV-I, Vol. I.
1941,cited in AAFHS-45, p. 62.
'94'.
Study IV-I, Vol. I.
I941-1942, p. 2 .
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
I . Peace and W a r : US. Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941, pp. 136-48 and sup-
porting documents; Report of t h e Joint
Committee on the Investigation of t h e
Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Cong., zd
sess.), Doc. 244, pp. 1-49.
2 . R e p o r t . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 53-57; USSBS Interrogation No.
65, Capt. Y. Watanabe, 1 5 Oct. 1945; No.
1 1 3 , Capt. M. Fuchido, 10 Oct. 1945; No.
479, Capt. &I. Genda, 28-29 Nov. 1945;
No. 603, Capt. M. Fuchido, 28 Nov. 1945.
3. Interrogations cited in n. 2 ; Hear-
ings before the Joint Committee on the
Investigation. of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22.
4. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
57, which apparently regards an earlier
reconnaissance flight as a separate wave,
685