“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 8 7 - 9 6
MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov. 1941;
unrecorded interview with Col. Cecil E.
Combs by Maj. R.L. Watson, 19 Jan.
'945.
99. Ltr., MacArthur to Marshall, 29
Nov. 1941; 1st ind. (ltr., Chief, AAF
Historical Office to CG Third Air Force,
50 Jan. 1946), Brereton to Paul; Brady
interview, as in n. 98; statement of Col.
R.L. Fry, 5th Air Base Gp., 18 Apr. 1944,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 8.
100. 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Brady interview; Elsmore state-
ment, as in n. 98; Fry statement, as in
n. 99; interview with Maj. E.H. Heald,
communications officer, V Air Force
Service Command, 1 5 May 1944, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11,
Doc. 17.
101. Brady interview; A G 370.5 ( I *
15-41)
1941; A G 370.5
MC-C-M to C G AFCC, 2 2 Oct.
(10-27-41) MC-C-M to
C G AFCC, 30 Oct. 1941; Fourth Air
Force Historical Study IV-I, Vol. 11,
Docs. 42-66; Lt. Rob Roy Carruthers, in
435th [Bomb. Sq.1 Overseas, in History,
19th Bomb. Gp.; History of USAFIA,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11, Doc. 26; History, 7th Bomb. Gp.,
1942; AAFRH-11, pp. 34, 84-85; AAF
Historical Study No. 9, The AAF in
Australia to the Summer of 1942, pp.
1 0 2 . 1st ind., Brereton to Paul, as in
n. 99; Elsniore statement, as in n. 98;
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 8 9 .
103. AAFRH-11, pp. 39-41; tel. con-
versations, 26, 27, 29 Nov. and 3, 4 Dec.
1941, in Fourth Air Force Historical
104. Statement of Sec. of War Stim-
son to Pearl Harbor lnvestigating Com-
mittee, N e w Y o r k Times, 2 2 Mar. 1946.
105. Report of the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack (79th Cong., zd sess.), Doc. 244,
p. 102.
106. Msg. #624, Marshall to CG
USAFFE, 27 NOV.1941.
107. Ltr., Hart to MacArthur, 2 3 Oct.
1941; ltr., MacArthur to Hart, 7 Nov.
194'.
11-12.
Study IV-I, Vol. 11, DOCS.42-46.
108. AAFRH-11, pp. 42-43; msg.
#1oo4, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Nov.
1941; Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to
War, and from 8 Dec. 1941 to 1 7 Feb.
1942; Col. W.P. Fisher, Report on Philip-
pine and Java Operations (n.d. but some-
time during spring of 1942) ; Brady inter-
view; History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11, Doc. 82.
109. USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation
74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 Oct.
'945.
1 1 0 . History, 24th Pursuit Gp.
I I I . Msg. # 1 1 0 5 , MacArthur to
1 1 2 . AAFRH-11, pp. 4p-50, 85.
1 1 3 . Ibid., p. 85; AAFH%, pp. 11-12.
114. Fourth Air Force Historical
1 1 5 . Ltr., Short to Arnold, 6 Dec.
116. Ibid., pp. 5 ~ 6 2 ,88 (n. 17).
117. Ltr., Arnold to Martin, I Dec.
118. Fourth Air Force Historical
119. AAF in the W a r against Japan,
AGWAR, 6 Dec. 1941.
Study, IV-I, Vol. I.
1941,cited in AAFHS-45, p. 62.
'94'.
Study IV-I, Vol. I.
I941-1942, p. 2 .
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
I . Peace and W a r : US. Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941, pp. 136-48 and sup-
porting documents; Report of t h e Joint
Committee on the Investigation of t h e
Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Cong., zd
sess.), Doc. 244, pp. 1-49.
2 . R e p o r t . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,
pp. 53-57; USSBS Interrogation No.
65, Capt. Y. Watanabe, 1 5 Oct. 1945; No.
1 1 3 , Capt. M. Fuchido, 10 Oct. 1945; No.
479, Capt. &I. Genda, 28-29 Nov. 1945;
No. 603, Capt. M. Fuchido, 28 Nov. 1945.
3. Interrogations cited in n. 2 ; Hear-
ings before the Joint Committee on the
Investigation. of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 420-22.
4. R e p o r t . . .Pearl Harbor Attack, p.
57, which apparently regards an earlier
reconnaissance flight as a separate wave,
685