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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S local defense of strategic points-New Yorli, the Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, etc.-and other units should be attached to ground and sea forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as other powers were developing aviation for “striking their adversaries as far away from their own countries as possible,” the United States should have as its first objec- tive the “creation of an air force capable of the greatest radius of action practicable under the conditions limited by personnel, material, and armament.” 92 A n efficient air force organized according to these principles “would be able to protect the country from invasion and would insure its independence but would not be able to subject a hostile country to invasion without leaving the country itself.” 93 Fortunately the string of northern islands led away from, as well as toward, the United States. They could be seized, held by air units plus a small ground force garrison, supplied if necessary by air transport, and used as a means of striking directly at the industrial heart of a European or Asiatic enemy.94W a r might become then first a struggle for air bases, followed by a strategic bombardment campaign. In the end ground forces must actually take over the enemy’s territory, but through its long-range operations the “influence of air power on the ability of one nation to impress its will on another in an armed conflict will be decisive.” 9 5 Under the guise of Winged Defense Mitchell was pleading the cause of an offensive weapon to be used in a fashion not yet sanctioned by custom. Highly sensitive to public opinion, he was somewhat handi- capped in drawing a realistic picture by his concern with his audience. T h e wisdom of having entered World W a r I was widely questioned, so Mitchell had to assume that we would go to war only if attacked directly and that we would fight without allies who might provide advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air force power is the bombardment airplane” and that strategic bombardment was “the one outstanding development that occurred in the European War.” O 6 Yet he was most specific in describing the effects of such warfare if applied against the United States; civilians are shown stampeding in N e w York under aerial attack but not in Berlin or Tokyo. It was the same sort of disingenuousness which made him speak of bombing the sources of an enemy’s productive power but “not so much the people themselves” 97-as if some subtle distinction would be made between factory and worker. In his last book, a sort of primer for the layman called Skyways 4’
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