“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 8 - 7 5
50. 9th ind. (%id.), C/AAF to TAG,
16 Sept. 1941.
51. Alaska-Hawaii Journal, in AFSHO
files.
52. History, XI Air Force Service
Command.
53. History, 36th Bomb. Sq. to 7 Dec.
'94'.
54. History, XI' Air Force Service
Command.
5 5 . AAF Historical Study No. 41,
Operational History of the Seventh Air
Force; 7 Dec. 1941-6 Nov. 1943, p. I.
56. Report of Army-Navy Board,
Hawaii, 3 1 Oct. 1941.
57. AAFHS-41, p. 2 .
58. Administrative History, Hq. Sev-
enth Air Force, 1916-May 1944.
59. Biennial Report, C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941-30 June 1943.
60. Radg. No. 2032, Herron to TAG,
31 Dec. 1940.
61. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
IV-I, Processing and Ferrying Functions
of the Fourth Air Force through the
Year 1941, Vol. I.
62. AAF Reference History No. 1 1 ,
Army Air Action in the Philippines and
Netherlands East Indies, 1941-42, p. 13.
tory, First Air Force, 111, Pt. 10, 12-15;
R&R, C/AS to A-4, 8 Dec. 1941.
26. History, First Air Force, IIr, Pt.
10, 15-18.
27. Operations Plan of Iceland Base
Command, I Aug. 1941; J.B. No. 325
(Serial 697-1).
28. Memo for Brig. Gen. Clarence L.
Tinker from Arnold, 9 Sept. 1941; ltr.,
Tinker to C/AAF, 7 Oct. 1941.
29. Memo for AC/AS, A-3 from
Spaatz, 31 Oct. 1941.
30. Memo for Gen. Marshall from
Col. H.W. Shelmire, 8 Nov. 1941.
31. R&R, AWPD to A-I, 2 Dec. 1941.
32. AAF Historical Study No. 42,
Air Defense of the Panama Canal, I Jan.
1939-7 Dec. 1941, pp. 127, 187, 198.
33. Zbid., pp. I, 10-11, 60-61.
34. Zbid., pp. 26-28, 38, 82-86, 113,
35. Ltr., T A G to Chief of Engineers,
36. T h e Bermuda Defense Project
37. Approved Garrisons, Overseas
38. AAFHS-42, pp. 171-72.
39. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
40. The Panama Canal Defense Proj-
41. AAFHS-42, pp. 1 1 2 , 193-94.
42. Zbid., pp. 125, 180-98.
43. AAF Historical Study No. 4,
Alaskan Air Defense and the Japanese
Invasion of the Aleutians, App. A.
44. History, Eleventh Air Force; His-
tory, XI Air Force Service Command.
45. AAFHS-4, pp. IC-15, 27-28.
46. Ibid., pp. 11-15, 23.
47. Zbid., pp. 18-19, 38-39, 97-102;
History, Alaskan Div., A T C to 7 Dec.
194'.
48. History, 59th Gp., 3d Wing,
AACS, 1 1 Jan.-8 Dec. 1941.
49. 7th ind. (original Itr. not listed),
Hq. Western Defense Command to
TAG, 10 Sept. 1941, in AFSHO files.
161-62, 171.
3 Apr. 1941.
(Initial), 16 Apr. 1941.
Bases, 9 Oct. 1941.
10, r5-18.
ect, 1941, rev. I Dec. 1941.
63. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
IV-I, Vol. I.
64. Report of Army-Navy Board,
Hawaii.
65. Excerpts from Joint Action of the
Army and Navy, cited in memo for Brig,
Gen. C.L. Tinker by Lt. Col. K.N.
Walker, 13 Dec. 1941.
66. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan-Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 20 Aug.
1941, cited in memo in n. 65.
67. Ltr., Maj. Gen. F.L. Martin to CG
AAF, 14 Aug. 1941,with A Plan for the
Employment of Bombardment Aviation
in the Defense of Oahu.
68. Memo for Gen. Gerow, W P D
from Rear Adm. R.K. Turner, Director
of Navy WPD, 25 Oct. 1941; memo for
AC/S, W P D (unsigned), 30 Oct. 1941,
in AFSHO files.
69. Radg. No. 967, Ft. Shafter to
TAG, 2 8 Nov. 1941; memo for AC/S,
683