“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 6 - 5 8
in AWPD/I, Misc.; R&R, C/AS to 9. History, First Air Force, Project I,
OCAC, Further Expansion of AAF, 6
Oct* ‘9419 in III-B-I-81 m; inter-
Views With COl. R.D. Hughes, 1 5 Sept.
19439 and Brig. Gen*Has. Hansel1, 5 Oct*
‘9439 both at London, B*C*
Hughes added these to those
listed in the text as collaborators on
A w D / I : Cole O d l e Anderson, CaPt.
Ball, Capt. Moss, and himself. The im-
portance of Hansell’s contribution is
indicated by a memo, An Air Estimate
of the Situations for the Employment of
the Air Striking Force in Europe ( A B C
I ) , forwarded through General Chaney
of SPOBS.
Vol. I, Organizational Development.
10. Ibid.; History, Air Defense Corn-
mand; History, Third Air Force, 1941-
1944, pp. 6-10; History, 111 Fighter
Command, 29 Apr.-6 Dec. 1941, pp. I-
31; History, IV Fighter Command, 18
Dee. 1940-31 Dee. 1 ~ 4 4 ,pp. I-Io; His-
tory, I Interceptor Command, z June
1941-25 M~~ 1942,vol.1.
I I . Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-1, Defense Plans 2nd Operations in
the Fourth Air Force through the Year
’94’, vO1* I*
12. History, Army Airways Commu-
nications System, 1938-45, pp. I 15-28.
13. History, I Interceptor Command.
14. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
10, 4-7.
15. Ltr., Newfoundland Base Com-
mand to TAG. 28 AUP. IOAI: 1st ind.
139. AWPD/I.
140. Tab 2.
141. Tabs 7-9.
142. Tab 2, par. 5.
143. Tab 2 , par. 6 .
144. Tab 3.
145. Tab 4.
1 ~ 6 .Tab ID.
147. Tabs 11-12.
148. Tab 1 3 .
149. USSBS, Summary Report (Euro-
pean War),3 0 Sept. 1945.
150. See articles on “New Moves to-
ward an AEF,” Chicago Daily Tribune,
19 Aug. 1941; and “More Steps toward
an AEF,” ibid., 27 Nov. 1941.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
I . AC Field Manual 1-5, Employment
of Aviation of the Army, 1 5 Apr. 1940.
2. Biennial Report of C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941-30 June 1943.
3 . AC Field Manual 1-5.
4. History, Air Defense Command, 2 6
5 . Edgar McInnis, T h e War: Second
6. History, Air Defense Command.
7. As cited in AAF Historical Study
No. 19, Civilian Volunteer Activities in
the AAF, pp. 8-10.
8. History, Air Defense Command.
Feb. 1940-2 June 1941.
Year (New York, 19411,pp. 6ff.
682
Y I .
(ltr., GHQ to’ TAG, 28 Aug. 1 9 4 1 ) ~
16. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
10, 7-11.
17. Memo for DC/S for Air from
AC/S, WPD, 26 June 1941; ltr., Maj.
Gen. G.C. Brant to Arnold, 3 0 Oct. 1941;
ltr., AC Weather Det., Newfoundland
Air Base to C/AC, 7 Oct. 1941.
18. Ltr., Adm. Harold R. Stark to
C/S US. Army, 8 Nov. 1941.
19. Ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. G.C.
Brant, 27 Nov. 1941.
20. Report of the South Greenland
Expedition, 17 Mar+ June 1941;memo
for Spaatz from Capt. Paul C. Oscanyan,
6 Sept. 1941.
2 1 . Memo for C/S from Sec. of Air
Staff, 25 July 1941.
2 2 . Extract, tel. conversation, Mr.
Lovett and Gen. Brett, 14 Apr. 1941;
memo for C/NO from C/S, z May 1941.
23. Ltr., T A G to C/S GHQ, 1 5 July
1941.; A G 320.2 (11-5-41) MC-C-M,
Activation of Greenland Base Command,
24. Approved Garrisons, Overseas
Bases, 9 Oct. 1941.
2 5 . History, Army Airways Commu-
nications System, 1938-45, p. 128; His-
T A G to C/S GHQ, 1 3 NOV.1941.
26 NOV.1941.