“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 6 - 5 8
in AWPD/I, Misc.; R&R, C/AS to 9. History, First Air Force, Project I,
OCAC, Further Expansion of AAF, 6
Oct* ‘9419 in III-B-I-81 m; inter-
Views With COl. R.D. Hughes, 1 5 Sept.
19439 and Brig. Gen*Has. Hansel1, 5 Oct*
‘9439 both at London, B*C*
Hughes added these to those
listed in the text as collaborators on
A w D / I : Cole O d l e Anderson, CaPt.
Ball, Capt. Moss, and himself. The im-
portance of Hansell’s contribution is
indicated by a memo, An Air Estimate
of the Situations for the Employment of
the Air Striking Force in Europe ( A B C
I ) , forwarded through General Chaney
of SPOBS.
Vol. I, Organizational Development.
10. Ibid.; History, Air Defense Corn-
mand; History, Third Air Force, 1941-
1944, pp. 6-10; History, 111 Fighter
Command, 29 Apr.-6 Dec. 1941, pp. I-
31; History, IV Fighter Command, 18
Dee. 1940-31 Dee. 1 ~ 4 4 ,pp. I-Io; His-
tory, I Interceptor Command, z June
1941-25 M~~ 1942,vol.1.
I I . Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-1, Defense Plans 2nd Operations in
the Fourth Air Force through the Year
’94’, vO1* I*
12. History, Army Airways Commu-
nications System, 1938-45, pp. I 15-28.
13. History, I Interceptor Command.
14. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
10, 4-7.
15. Ltr., Newfoundland Base Com-
mand to TAG. 28 AUP. IOAI: 1st ind.
139. AWPD/I.
140. Tab 2.
141. Tabs 7-9.
142. Tab 2, par. 5.
143. Tab 2 , par. 6 .
144. Tab 3.
145. Tab 4.
1 ~ 6 .Tab ID.
147. Tabs 11-12.
148. Tab 1 3 .
149. USSBS, Summary Report (Euro-
pean War),3 0 Sept. 1945.
150. See articles on “New Moves to-
ward an AEF,” Chicago Daily Tribune,
19 Aug. 1941; and “More Steps toward
an AEF,” ibid., 27 Nov. 1941.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
I . AC Field Manual 1-5, Employment
of Aviation of the Army, 1 5 Apr. 1940.
2. Biennial Report of C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941-30 June 1943.
3 . AC Field Manual 1-5.
4. History, Air Defense Command, 2 6
5 . Edgar McInnis, T h e War: Second
6. History, Air Defense Command.
7. As cited in AAF Historical Study
No. 19, Civilian Volunteer Activities in
the AAF, pp. 8-10.
8. History, Air Defense Command.
Feb. 1940-2 June 1941.
Year (New York, 19411,pp. 6ff.
682
Y I .
(ltr., GHQ to’ TAG, 28 Aug. 1 9 4 1 ) ~
16. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
10, 7-11.
17. Memo for DC/S for Air from
AC/S, WPD, 26 June 1941; ltr., Maj.
Gen. G.C. Brant to Arnold, 3 0 Oct. 1941;
ltr., AC Weather Det., Newfoundland
Air Base to C/AC, 7 Oct. 1941.
18. Ltr., Adm. Harold R. Stark to
C/S US. Army, 8 Nov. 1941.
19. Ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. G.C.
Brant, 27 Nov. 1941.
20. Report of the South Greenland
Expedition, 17 Mar+ June 1941;memo
for Spaatz from Capt. Paul C. Oscanyan,
6 Sept. 1941.
2 1 . Memo for C/S from Sec. of Air
Staff, 25 July 1941.
2 2 . Extract, tel. conversation, Mr.
Lovett and Gen. Brett, 14 Apr. 1941;
memo for C/NO from C/S, z May 1941.
23. Ltr., T A G to C/S GHQ, 1 5 July
1941.; A G 320.2 (11-5-41) MC-C-M,
Activation of Greenland Base Command,
24. Approved Garrisons, Overseas
Bases, 9 Oct. 1941.
2 5 . History, Army Airways Commu-
nications System, 1938-45, p. 128; His-
T A G to C/S GHQ, 1 3 NOV.1941.
26 NOV.1941.