“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 0 - 4 6
95. Address to the Congress, in Peace
96. “Lend-Lease Act,” 1 1 Mar. 1941,
97. AAFRH-6.
98. E.R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease,
W e a p o n for Victory (New York, 1944)~
and W a r , pp. 608-11.
ibid., pp. 627-30.
p. 89.
99. Events, p. 275.
100. United States-British Staff Con-
versations: Air Collaboration (short title,
A B C z ) , 29 Mar. 1941.
1 0 1 . Radio address, in Peace and W a r ,
1 0 2 . Draft A M Historical Study,
Logistical Plans and Problems, 1941-43,
with Special Reference to Build-up of
the Eighth Air Force, p. 3.
1 0 3 . Munitions Requirements of the
AAF for the Defeat of Our Potential
Enemies (short title, AWPD/I), Tabs I
and 14.
PP. 599-608-
104. AAFRH-6.
105. B.H. (41) 10, Conference on
British-US. Production, Victory Re-
quirements, Interim Report, 17 Sept.
‘94’.
106. B.H. (41) 14, Conference on Brit-
ish-US. Production, Victory Require-
ments, Report by Planning Committee,
19 Sept. 1941;B.H. (41) zd Mtg. of War
Cabinet, 20 Sept. 1941.
107. See sources in n. 106.
108. Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 125-26.
109. AAFRH-6.
110. Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of Airplanes and Related
Equipment for Defense Aid, 9 Sept. 1941
(short title, AWPD/z).
1 1 2 . See the following exchange of
letters in WP I-General: FDR to Stim-
son, 18 Sept. 1941; Stimson to FDR, 23
Sept.; FDR to Stimson, 14 Oct.; Stimson
to FDR, 16 Oct. and 2 1 Oct.
1 1 3 . AAFRH-6.
114. Ibid.
1 1 5 . Ibid.
I 16. United States-British Staff Con-
versations (short title, ABC-I), 27 Mar.
‘941.
I 17. Ibid., Annex 111, US.-British
Commonwealth Joint W a r Plan.
118. r have fouvd no record of ap-
proval of ABCI, but both RAINBOW
No. 5 and AWPD/I are specifically
based on it.
119. Memo for Col. Eaker from H.S.
Hansell, 3 1 Oct. 1939.
120. Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5, 30 Apr. 1941;
War Department Operations Plan,
RAINBOW No. 5 . The latter was ap-
proved by the Chief of Staff on 19
August 1941.
1 2 1 . Radio address, 27 May 1941, in
Peace and W a r , p. 664.
1 2 2 . By the S/W, z June 1941;by the
S/N, 29 May.
123. Joint Army and Navy Basic W a r
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5 (Rev. No. I ) .
124. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, C/AS, Revision
of Rainbow No. 5 , Where It Pertains to
Air Action, n.d. (after 19 Aug. 1941).
1 2 5 . N e w York Times, 1 7 Aug. 1941.
126. Text in Peace and W a r , pp.
127. N e w York Times,17 Aug. 1941.
128. General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff, 3 1 July 1941,
signed by Dudley Pound, J. G. Dill, C.
Portal.
129. N e w York Times, 5 and 8 July
‘941.
130. J.B. No. 3 2 5 (Serial p 9 ) , 25 Sept.
1941,Joint Board to SPOBS, Comments
on General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff.
7 I 8-19.
131. Ibid.
132. AL (41) 8th Mtg., War Cabinet,
1 3 3 . Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
134. App. I. Estimates based on “Two
Ocean Navy” plus t o per cent tonnage
plus additional aircraft.
135. Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
136. App. 11.
137. AWPD/I, Tabs 1 3 and I .
138. Data for this paragraph taken
from: memo for the C/AS, Notes on
Preparation of AWPD/r, 18 Nov. 1941,
American Liaison, 21 Nov. 1941.
68 I