“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 0 - 4 6
95. Address to the Congress, in Peace
96. “Lend-Lease Act,” 1 1 Mar. 1941,
97. AAFRH-6.
98. E.R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease,
W e a p o n for Victory (New York, 1944)~
and W a r , pp. 608-11.
ibid., pp. 627-30.
p. 89.
99. Events, p. 275.
100. United States-British Staff Con-
versations: Air Collaboration (short title,
A B C z ) , 29 Mar. 1941.
1 0 1 . Radio address, in Peace and W a r ,
1 0 2 . Draft A M Historical Study,
Logistical Plans and Problems, 1941-43,
with Special Reference to Build-up of
the Eighth Air Force, p. 3.
1 0 3 . Munitions Requirements of the
AAF for the Defeat of Our Potential
Enemies (short title, AWPD/I), Tabs I
and 14.
PP. 599-608-
104. AAFRH-6.
105. B.H. (41) 10, Conference on
British-US. Production, Victory Re-
quirements, Interim Report, 17 Sept.
‘94’.
106. B.H. (41) 14, Conference on Brit-
ish-US. Production, Victory Require-
ments, Report by Planning Committee,
19 Sept. 1941;B.H. (41) zd Mtg. of War
Cabinet, 20 Sept. 1941.
107. See sources in n. 106.
108. Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 125-26.
109. AAFRH-6.
110. Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of Airplanes and Related
Equipment for Defense Aid, 9 Sept. 1941
(short title, AWPD/z).
1 1 2 . See the following exchange of
letters in WP I-General: FDR to Stim-
son, 18 Sept. 1941; Stimson to FDR, 23
Sept.; FDR to Stimson, 14 Oct.; Stimson
to FDR, 16 Oct. and 2 1 Oct.
1 1 3 . AAFRH-6.
114. Ibid.
1 1 5 . Ibid.
I 16. United States-British Staff Con-
versations (short title, ABC-I), 27 Mar.
‘941.
I 17. Ibid., Annex 111, US.-British
Commonwealth Joint W a r Plan.
118. r have fouvd no record of ap-
proval of ABCI, but both RAINBOW
No. 5 and AWPD/I are specifically
based on it.
119. Memo for Col. Eaker from H.S.
Hansell, 3 1 Oct. 1939.
120. Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5, 30 Apr. 1941;
War Department Operations Plan,
RAINBOW No. 5 . The latter was ap-
proved by the Chief of Staff on 19
August 1941.
1 2 1 . Radio address, 27 May 1941, in
Peace and W a r , p. 664.
1 2 2 . By the S/W, z June 1941;by the
S/N, 29 May.
123. Joint Army and Navy Basic W a r
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5 (Rev. No. I ) .
124. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, C/AS, Revision
of Rainbow No. 5 , Where It Pertains to
Air Action, n.d. (after 19 Aug. 1941).
1 2 5 . N e w York Times, 1 7 Aug. 1941.
126. Text in Peace and W a r , pp.
127. N e w York Times,17 Aug. 1941.
128. General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff, 3 1 July 1941,
signed by Dudley Pound, J. G. Dill, C.
Portal.
129. N e w York Times, 5 and 8 July
‘941.
130. J.B. No. 3 2 5 (Serial p 9 ) , 25 Sept.
1941,Joint Board to SPOBS, Comments
on General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff.
7 I 8-19.
131. Ibid.
132. AL (41) 8th Mtg., War Cabinet,
1 3 3 . Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
134. App. I. Estimates based on “Two
Ocean Navy” plus t o per cent tonnage
plus additional aircraft.
135. Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
136. App. 11.
137. AWPD/I, Tabs 1 3 and I .
138. Data for this paragraph taken
from: memo for the C/AS, Notes on
Preparation of AWPD/r, 18 Nov. 1941,
American Liaison, 21 Nov. 1941.
68 I