“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 0 - 4 6
95. Address to the Congress, in Peace
96. “Lend-Lease Act,” 1 1 Mar. 1941,
97. AAFRH-6.
98. E.R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease,
W e a p o n for Victory (New York, 1944)~
and W a r , pp. 608-11.
ibid., pp. 627-30.
p. 89.
99. Events, p. 275.
100. United States-British Staff Con-
versations: Air Collaboration (short title,
A B C z ) , 29 Mar. 1941.
1 0 1 . Radio address, in Peace and W a r ,
1 0 2 . Draft A M Historical Study,
Logistical Plans and Problems, 1941-43,
with Special Reference to Build-up of
the Eighth Air Force, p. 3.
1 0 3 . Munitions Requirements of the
AAF for the Defeat of Our Potential
Enemies (short title, AWPD/I), Tabs I
and 14.
PP. 599-608-
104. AAFRH-6.
105. B.H. (41) 10, Conference on
British-US. Production, Victory Re-
quirements, Interim Report, 17 Sept.
‘94’.
106. B.H. (41) 14, Conference on Brit-
ish-US. Production, Victory Require-
ments, Report by Planning Committee,
19 Sept. 1941;B.H. (41) zd Mtg. of War
Cabinet, 20 Sept. 1941.
107. See sources in n. 106.
108. Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 125-26.
109. AAFRH-6.
110. Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of Airplanes and Related
Equipment for Defense Aid, 9 Sept. 1941
(short title, AWPD/z).
1 1 2 . See the following exchange of
letters in WP I-General: FDR to Stim-
son, 18 Sept. 1941; Stimson to FDR, 23
Sept.; FDR to Stimson, 14 Oct.; Stimson
to FDR, 16 Oct. and 2 1 Oct.
1 1 3 . AAFRH-6.
114. Ibid.
1 1 5 . Ibid.
I 16. United States-British Staff Con-
versations (short title, ABC-I), 27 Mar.
‘941.
I 17. Ibid., Annex 111, US.-British
Commonwealth Joint W a r Plan.
118. r have fouvd no record of ap-
proval of ABCI, but both RAINBOW
No. 5 and AWPD/I are specifically
based on it.
119. Memo for Col. Eaker from H.S.
Hansell, 3 1 Oct. 1939.
120. Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5, 30 Apr. 1941;
War Department Operations Plan,
RAINBOW No. 5 . The latter was ap-
proved by the Chief of Staff on 19
August 1941.
1 2 1 . Radio address, 27 May 1941, in
Peace and W a r , p. 664.
1 2 2 . By the S/W, z June 1941;by the
S/N, 29 May.
123. Joint Army and Navy Basic W a r
Plan, RAINBOW No. 5 (Rev. No. I ) .
124. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, C/AS, Revision
of Rainbow No. 5 , Where It Pertains to
Air Action, n.d. (after 19 Aug. 1941).
1 2 5 . N e w York Times, 1 7 Aug. 1941.
126. Text in Peace and W a r , pp.
127. N e w York Times,17 Aug. 1941.
128. General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff, 3 1 July 1941,
signed by Dudley Pound, J. G. Dill, C.
Portal.
129. N e w York Times, 5 and 8 July
‘941.
130. J.B. No. 3 2 5 (Serial p 9 ) , 25 Sept.
1941,Joint Board to SPOBS, Comments
on General Strategy, Review by the
British Chiefs of Staff.
7 I 8-19.
131. Ibid.
132. AL (41) 8th Mtg., War Cabinet,
1 3 3 . Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
134. App. I. Estimates based on “Two
Ocean Navy” plus t o per cent tonnage
plus additional aircraft.
135. Joint Board Estimate, p. 15.
136. App. 11.
137. AWPD/I, Tabs 1 3 and I .
138. Data for this paragraph taken
from: memo for the C/AS, Notes on
Preparation of AWPD/r, 18 Nov. 1941,
American Liaison, 21 Nov. 1941.
68 I