“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 9 - 2 9
55. Report on Air Corps Mission
under the Monroe Doctrine, by the Air
Corps Board, Study No. 44, 17 Oct. 1938.
56. Final Report of Air Corps Board
on Division of Five Year Experimental
Program, 2 3 June 1939.
57. Requirements, as in n. 54.
58. Memo for Col. Loughry from
Lt. Col. Orlando Ward, 25 July 1939, and
reply, 2 7 July.
59. Requirements, as in n. 54.
60. Peace and War, p. 440.
61. Events, p. 219.
62. Peace and War, p. 562.
63. Events, p. 254.
64. Message to the Congress, in Peace
and War, pp. 56467.
65. Agreement signed 27 March 1941
(Events, p. 274).
66. John Bartlet Brebner, North At-
lantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada,
the United States and Great Britain
(New Haven, 1945).
67. History, First Air Force, 111, Pt.
10, 1-4.
68. Ibid.; ltr., Sec. of War to the
President, 28 Nov. 1940; Survey of Air
Rase Sites in Newfoundland, 18 0ct.-r
69. Survey of Air Base Sites in New-
foundland, 18 Oct.-I Nov. 1940.
70. Statement by the Department of
State, 10 Apr. 1941, in Peace and War,
p. 641.
71. Text of the Agreement, ibid., pp.
72. Ltr., C/NO to Navy WPD, et al.,
73. Memo for C/S from WPD, Feb.
74. Message to the Congress, in Peace
75. Histories, 33d Fighter Sq. and
76. SPOBS, as in n. 23.
77. 24 November (Events, p. 304).
78. AAF Historical Study No. 42, Air
Defense of the Panama Canal, I Jan.
1939-7 Dec. 1941, passim.
NOV.1940.
642-46.
6 May 1941.
1941.
and W a r , pp. 686-90.
556th Signal Aircraft Warning Bn.
680
79. A m y Air Forces in the W a r
against Japan, ig41-igqz (Washington,
80. AAF Historical Study No. 45,
Development of the South Pacific Air
Route, passim.
81. AAF Historical Study No. 4,
Alaskan Air Defense and the Japanese
Invasion of the Aleutians, pp. 1-27.
‘945)1 pp. 4-7.
82. Peace and War, p. 485.
83. This seems to be borne out by
both AIPO (Gallup) and Fortune polls.
See P.E. Jacob, “Influences of World
Events on US. Neutrality,” Public Opin-
ion Quarterly, IV (March 1940), 63-64.
84. AIPO polls: September 1938, 86
per cent thought the Allies would win;
September 1939, 82 per cent.
85. Jacob, op. cit., p. 61.
86. On an AIPO poll asking “Which
side do you think will win the war if no
other countries go into it?” only 43 per
cent said England (20 July 1940). On
the question of whether the United
States would be drawn into the war, an
AIPO poll of 15 Feb. 1940 reported:
Yes, 3 2 per cent; No, 68 per cent. For-
tune, Aug. 1940, reported: Yes, 43.8 per
cent; No, 44.8 per cent; Don’t Know,
I 1.4 per cent.
87. On this trend see Johnson, op. cit.,
chaps. iv and v. In an AIPO poll of 18
July 1940 on aid to England, 53 per cent
thought we should give more help, 41
per cent that we were giving enough
now, 6 per cent that we were giving
too much.
88. Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72.
89. Address to the Congress, ibid., p.
449.
90. Address to the Congress, 2 1 Sept.,
ibid., p. 487; Neutrality Act of 4 Nov.,
ibid., pp. 494-506.
91. AAF Reference History No. 6,
Distribution of Air Materiel to the Allies
193B-p4: Controls, Procedures, and
Policies.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.