“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 0 5 - 1 9
Aviation Objective, 14 Mar. 1941.Public
announcement of the 84 Group Program
came on 2 3 October 1941. For a more
detailed discussion of these successive
programs see draft AAF Historical
Study, Development of AAF Base Facili-
ties, 1 9 3 ~ 4 s .
14. AAF Directory of Groups.
15. Address by Arnold at the Indus-
16. Ibid.
17. Message to the Congress, in Peace
and W a r , p. 530; Materiel Div., Summary
of Current Air Corps Programs, 19 July
‘940.
18. Arnold address as cited in n. 15.
19. Materiel Div., Consolidated Statis-
tical Report, Sec. I, Pt. 7, 30 Sept. 1941.
20. Special AAF Historical Study,
Review of Aerial Warfare for the Scien-
tific Advisory Board (Jan. 1945).
trial W a r College, 1 3 Feb. 1941.
2 1 . AAFHS-22, p. 46.
22. Review of Aerial Warfare; Re-
port of CG AAF to Sec. of W a r , 3 Jan.
‘944.
23. History, SPOBS Prior to Activa-
tion of ETO.
24. Data taken from Tactical Plan-
ning: Characteristics and Performance
Chart. There were other tactical planes
in production. These were the ones upon
which the AAF depended most.
25. For a complete list see Aircraft in
Use in the Royal Air Force by Types,
Oct. 1941,incl. to ltr., G/C D.F. Ander-
son to Maj. J.T. Clement, 10 Oct. 1941.
26. Peace and War, p. 81.
27. AAF Historical Study No. 10,
Organization of the Army Air Arm,
28. AAF Historical Study No. 15,
Procurement of Aircrew Trainees, pp.
8-9; A G 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M to C G
GHQAF and C/AC, Army’s Second
Aviation Objective, 14 Mar. 1941; PRO
releases, 14 June 1940 and 2 3 Oct. 1941.
29. History, Central Flying Training
Command, I Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941, pp.
27-31; History, West Coast Air Corps
Training Center, 8 July 1940-7 Dec.
‘935-437 p. 81.
19419 pp* 10-54-
30. History, West Coast Air Corps
Training Center, 8 July 1940-7 Dec.
3 1 . AAF Historical Study NO. 7,
Legislation Relating to the AAF Train-
ing Program, 1939 to 1943, pp. 39ff.
3 2 . Arnold statement as cited in n. 7.
3 3 . AAF Historical Study No. 26,
Individual Training in Aircraft Mainte-
nance in the AAF, pp. 2-11.
34. History, West Coast Air Corps
Training Center, 8 July 1940-7 Dec.
194’7 pp. 301-4.
35. History, AAF Technical Train-
ing Command.
36. History, West Coast Air Corps
Training Center, 8 July 1940-7 Dec.
1941, Pp. 1’3-54.
19419 PP. 298-997 301-4.
37. Ibid., pp. 197-204.
38. AAFHS-10, pp. 1-15.
39. Report of CG AAF to Sec. of
40. AR 95-5, 20 June 1941.
41. AAFHS-10, pp. 15-31.
41. Zbid.
43. Quoted in History, Central Flying
Training Command, I Jan. 1939-7 Dec.
‘941, p. 1.
44. Biennial Report, C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941.
45. Peace and War, p. 404.
46. Zbid., p. 448.
47. Ibid., p. 405.
48. See “National Defense Strategy, If
Britain Should Lose,” T i m e , 2 2 July 1940,
pp. 19-22; Johnson, op. cit., pp. 89-92.
W a r , 3 Jan. 1944.
49. Peace and W a r , p. 452.
5 0 . Zbid., pp. 517-32.
51, Joint Action of the Army and
Navy, I I Sept. 1935.
5 2 . Report of the Air Corps Board,
Study No. 44, 17 Oct. 1938.
53. Memo for AC/S, WPD, Air
Force Study, 14 Mar. 1939, in AAG 321,
Misc. Staff, Corps, or Dept.
54. Requirements Army Aviation for
Hemisphere Defense, 3 June 1940, in
AAG 381, War Plans.
679