“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 58-68
168. Pictorial History of the AAF,
169.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, pp. 8-11, 109.
170.Pictorial History of the AAF,
p. '97.
171. Memo for C/AC from Knerr,
2 3 May 1928; memo for CO zd Wing
from C/AC, 28 May 1928, and indorse-
ments; memo for C/MD from C/AC,
27 June 1928-all cited in Development
of the Heavy Bomber, pp. ~ I O .
172.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, p. 10, with citations to 1st ind.
(memo for C/MD from C/AC, 27 June
1928)~C/MD to C/AC, 21 July 1928;
memo for C/MD from CO zd Bomb.
Gp., 15 Feb. 1929.
173. zd ind. (memo for C/MD from
CJAC, 2 Feb. 1929). C/MD to C/AC, 15
Jan. 1930, cited in Development of
Heavy Bomber, p. 11.
174.Development of Heavy Bomber,
p. 1 1 , with citation to memo for C/AC
from Acting Comdt. ACTS, 19 Mar.
1930,together with zd ind., AC/MD to
C/AC, 1 2 Apr. 1930.
175. Attachment to memo for AS/W,
Procurement Program for the Air Corps
from 1940 to 1945,24 Nov. 1937.
176. See, for example, memo for S/W
from Andrews, Air Corps Procurement
Program, 24 Jan. 1938.
177. See in this connection a historical
account by Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick
in memo for AS/W, Conflict of Army
and Navy Programs, 9 Sept. 1927.
178.The governing statements of
policy are found in the Army Appro-
priation Act for 1921 (41 Stat. 954);
Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast
Defense [I~zo];Joint Action of the
b y and the Navy, 23 Apr. 1927.
179.War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931.
180.Annual Report of the Chief of
Staff, in Report of the Secretary of W a r
t o the President, 1931, p. 38.
181. Extract from hearing on H.R.
9920, 2 5 May 1932,in AFSHO collection
of miscellaneous data on Coast Defense,
111.
pp. 196, 198.
676
182.AG 660.2 in OCAC 370.3, Pro-
tection of Seacoast (1921-34).Note sup-
plied through the courtesy of Dr.
William A. Goss.
183.Memo for AC/S, WPD from
C/AC, 14 Nov. 1932;The Present Status
of Military Aviation and Its Trend of
Development, a lecture for delivery at
Army War College, 12 Sept. 1933, by
Maj. Gen. B.D. Foulois.
184.Memo for C/S from WPD, 28
185. Report of the GHQ Air Force
(Provisional), 1933 [no exact date given].
Quotations from pp. 5 , 6, 12-13.
NOV.1932.
186.Ibid., p. 12.
187. Memo for DC/S from C/AC, 1 2
Dec. 1933.
188. AG 112.05 (II-I~-~z),Sec. 2 ;
memo for C/S from DC/S, 1 2 May 1934.
189.See under that date, OCAC 452.1,
Heavy Bomber.
190.Memo for C/AC from MD, 4
Feb. 1935; Contract W535 ac-7618, 29
191.Memo for AG from C/AC, 8
192.Contract W 5 3 5 ac-8306, 17 Jan.
1936; Materiel Division chart, Status of
Deliveries of Airplanes on 1936 Procure-
ment Progdm [19381;War Department
Special Quarterly Report of Airplanes
[by Materiel Division, Wright Field],
as of 3 1 Mar., 30 June, 30 Sept. 1937;
Development of the Heavy Bomber,
pp. 18, 117-18,with citations there to
memo for AG from C/AC, I Oct. 1935;
1st ind. (memo for AG from AC/AC,
8 Nov. 1935), A G to C/AC, 2 1 Nov.
1935; and 000.93 (Special), Accident-
Wright, 30 Oct. 1935.
193.According to information sub-
sequently provided for General Amold,
Admiral Pratt's successor, Adm. William
H. Standley, promptly repudiated the
agreement. (Memo for Henry H. Arnold
from Maj. R.G. Hoyt, 1 1 Mar. 1936.)
194.J.B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539);
Joint Action of the Army and Navy,
'935-
195,3d ind. (ltr., Lt. Col. Olds to
CG zd Wing, GHQAF), 26 July 1937.
June 1935.
NOV.1935.