“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 58-68
168. Pictorial History of the AAF,
169.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, pp. 8-11, 109.
170.Pictorial History of the AAF,
p. '97.
171. Memo for C/AC from Knerr,
2 3 May 1928; memo for CO zd Wing
from C/AC, 28 May 1928, and indorse-
ments; memo for C/MD from C/AC,
27 June 1928-all cited in Development
of the Heavy Bomber, pp. ~ I O .
172.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, p. 10, with citations to 1st ind.
(memo for C/MD from C/AC, 27 June
1928)~C/MD to C/AC, 21 July 1928;
memo for C/MD from CO zd Bomb.
Gp., 15 Feb. 1929.
173. zd ind. (memo for C/MD from
CJAC, 2 Feb. 1929). C/MD to C/AC, 15
Jan. 1930, cited in Development of
Heavy Bomber, p. 11.
174.Development of Heavy Bomber,
p. 1 1 , with citation to memo for C/AC
from Acting Comdt. ACTS, 19 Mar.
1930,together with zd ind., AC/MD to
C/AC, 1 2 Apr. 1930.
175. Attachment to memo for AS/W,
Procurement Program for the Air Corps
from 1940 to 1945,24 Nov. 1937.
176. See, for example, memo for S/W
from Andrews, Air Corps Procurement
Program, 24 Jan. 1938.
177. See in this connection a historical
account by Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick
in memo for AS/W, Conflict of Army
and Navy Programs, 9 Sept. 1927.
178.The governing statements of
policy are found in the Army Appro-
priation Act for 1921 (41 Stat. 954);
Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast
Defense [I~zo];Joint Action of the
b y and the Navy, 23 Apr. 1927.
179.War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931.
180.Annual Report of the Chief of
Staff, in Report of the Secretary of W a r
t o the President, 1931, p. 38.
181. Extract from hearing on H.R.
9920, 2 5 May 1932,in AFSHO collection
of miscellaneous data on Coast Defense,
111.
pp. 196, 198.
676
182.AG 660.2 in OCAC 370.3, Pro-
tection of Seacoast (1921-34).Note sup-
plied through the courtesy of Dr.
William A. Goss.
183.Memo for AC/S, WPD from
C/AC, 14 Nov. 1932;The Present Status
of Military Aviation and Its Trend of
Development, a lecture for delivery at
Army War College, 12 Sept. 1933, by
Maj. Gen. B.D. Foulois.
184.Memo for C/S from WPD, 28
185. Report of the GHQ Air Force
(Provisional), 1933 [no exact date given].
Quotations from pp. 5 , 6, 12-13.
NOV.1932.
186.Ibid., p. 12.
187. Memo for DC/S from C/AC, 1 2
Dec. 1933.
188. AG 112.05 (II-I~-~z),Sec. 2 ;
memo for C/S from DC/S, 1 2 May 1934.
189.See under that date, OCAC 452.1,
Heavy Bomber.
190.Memo for C/AC from MD, 4
Feb. 1935; Contract W535 ac-7618, 29
191.Memo for AG from C/AC, 8
192.Contract W 5 3 5 ac-8306, 17 Jan.
1936; Materiel Division chart, Status of
Deliveries of Airplanes on 1936 Procure-
ment Progdm [19381;War Department
Special Quarterly Report of Airplanes
[by Materiel Division, Wright Field],
as of 3 1 Mar., 30 June, 30 Sept. 1937;
Development of the Heavy Bomber,
pp. 18, 117-18,with citations there to
memo for AG from C/AC, I Oct. 1935;
1st ind. (memo for AG from AC/AC,
8 Nov. 1935), A G to C/AC, 2 1 Nov.
1935; and 000.93 (Special), Accident-
Wright, 30 Oct. 1935.
193.According to information sub-
sequently provided for General Amold,
Admiral Pratt's successor, Adm. William
H. Standley, promptly repudiated the
agreement. (Memo for Henry H. Arnold
from Maj. R.G. Hoyt, 1 1 Mar. 1936.)
194.J.B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539);
Joint Action of the Army and Navy,
'935-
195,3d ind. (ltr., Lt. Col. Olds to
CG zd Wing, GHQAF), 26 July 1937.
June 1935.
NOV.1935.