“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 58-68
168. Pictorial History of the AAF,
169.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, pp. 8-11, 109.
170.Pictorial History of the AAF,
p. '97.
171. Memo for C/AC from Knerr,
2 3 May 1928; memo for CO zd Wing
from C/AC, 28 May 1928, and indorse-
ments; memo for C/MD from C/AC,
27 June 1928-all cited in Development
of the Heavy Bomber, pp. ~ I O .
172.Development of the Heavy
Bomber, p. 10, with citations to 1st ind.
(memo for C/MD from C/AC, 27 June
1928)~C/MD to C/AC, 21 July 1928;
memo for C/MD from CO zd Bomb.
Gp., 15 Feb. 1929.
173. zd ind. (memo for C/MD from
CJAC, 2 Feb. 1929). C/MD to C/AC, 15
Jan. 1930, cited in Development of
Heavy Bomber, p. 11.
174.Development of Heavy Bomber,
p. 1 1 , with citation to memo for C/AC
from Acting Comdt. ACTS, 19 Mar.
1930,together with zd ind., AC/MD to
C/AC, 1 2 Apr. 1930.
175. Attachment to memo for AS/W,
Procurement Program for the Air Corps
from 1940 to 1945,24 Nov. 1937.
176. See, for example, memo for S/W
from Andrews, Air Corps Procurement
Program, 24 Jan. 1938.
177. See in this connection a historical
account by Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick
in memo for AS/W, Conflict of Army
and Navy Programs, 9 Sept. 1927.
178.The governing statements of
policy are found in the Army Appro-
priation Act for 1921 (41 Stat. 954);
Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast
Defense [I~zo];Joint Action of the
b y and the Navy, 23 Apr. 1927.
179.War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931.
180.Annual Report of the Chief of
Staff, in Report of the Secretary of W a r
t o the President, 1931, p. 38.
181. Extract from hearing on H.R.
9920, 2 5 May 1932,in AFSHO collection
of miscellaneous data on Coast Defense,
111.
pp. 196, 198.
676
182.AG 660.2 in OCAC 370.3, Pro-
tection of Seacoast (1921-34).Note sup-
plied through the courtesy of Dr.
William A. Goss.
183.Memo for AC/S, WPD from
C/AC, 14 Nov. 1932;The Present Status
of Military Aviation and Its Trend of
Development, a lecture for delivery at
Army War College, 12 Sept. 1933, by
Maj. Gen. B.D. Foulois.
184.Memo for C/S from WPD, 28
185. Report of the GHQ Air Force
(Provisional), 1933 [no exact date given].
Quotations from pp. 5 , 6, 12-13.
NOV.1932.
186.Ibid., p. 12.
187. Memo for DC/S from C/AC, 1 2
Dec. 1933.
188. AG 112.05 (II-I~-~z),Sec. 2 ;
memo for C/S from DC/S, 1 2 May 1934.
189.See under that date, OCAC 452.1,
Heavy Bomber.
190.Memo for C/AC from MD, 4
Feb. 1935; Contract W535 ac-7618, 29
191.Memo for AG from C/AC, 8
192.Contract W 5 3 5 ac-8306, 17 Jan.
1936; Materiel Division chart, Status of
Deliveries of Airplanes on 1936 Procure-
ment Progdm [19381;War Department
Special Quarterly Report of Airplanes
[by Materiel Division, Wright Field],
as of 3 1 Mar., 30 June, 30 Sept. 1937;
Development of the Heavy Bomber,
pp. 18, 117-18,with citations there to
memo for AG from C/AC, I Oct. 1935;
1st ind. (memo for AG from AC/AC,
8 Nov. 1935), A G to C/AC, 2 1 Nov.
1935; and 000.93 (Special), Accident-
Wright, 30 Oct. 1935.
193.According to information sub-
sequently provided for General Amold,
Admiral Pratt's successor, Adm. William
H. Standley, promptly repudiated the
agreement. (Memo for Henry H. Arnold
from Maj. R.G. Hoyt, 1 1 Mar. 1936.)
194.J.B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539);
Joint Action of the Army and Navy,
'935-
195,3d ind. (ltr., Lt. Col. Olds to
CG zd Wing, GHQAF), 26 July 1937.
June 1935.
NOV.1935.