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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Invaders”15 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 has brought with it a new doctrine of war.. .and a new doctrine of peace.” 8 4 Formerly the oceans had made difficult any attack against the United States, but the “coming of aircraft has greatly modified this isolation on account of the great range and speed which these agents of communication are developing.” The heart of the nation’s war po- tential lay in a triangle marked by Bangor, Norfolk, and Chicago.85 The complex functioning of that area was so delicately balanced as to be highly vulnerable to air attack. Bombers could paralyze transporta- tion by hitting a few chokepoints, could render governmental and in- dustrial centers impotent: “A few shells, gas, explosive or incendiary, landed in Manhattan would cause a complete evacuation.” 8 0 Disrupt the tightly integrated activities of that vital triangle, and “resistance is no longer possible and capitulation is the outcome.” 8 7 Even in the air age geography favored the United States; it was far less open to air attack than European nations. But its immunity, only relative, was steadily diminishing with improved performance of aircraft. At first Mitchell was greatly concerned with the possibility of carrier-borne attacks against America once that fast “floating air- dromes” had been adapted to the use of bombers. His belief, however, in the inherent superiority of land-based over carrier-based or float planes and the increasing range of the former made them appear the chief threat. In 1925 Mitchell pointed out that England could trans- port aircraft to the St. Lawrence area whence they could menace the whole of the vital triangle; in 1927 he was claiming that parts of that region could be attacked directly from His main con- cern, however, was with the northern approaches to the American continent. Airplanes already in service could easily cross the North At- lantic, staging from island to island with no overwater flight of more than 400 miles. In the North Pacific only the narrow Bering Strait separated Siberia from Alaska, and farther south the Aleutians con- stituted a natural avenue of approach. Eventually, he thought, aircraft would “follow the meridians straight over the top of the earth.” Against a waterborne attack an efficient air force would be the cheapest form of protection; against the new threat it was the only defense. Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best be held to a minimum by aggressive air action, and U.S. aviation should be organized ac- cordingly. Defensive air units, chiefly pursuit, should be assigned for 40
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