The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
has brought with it a new doctrine of war.. .and a new doctrine of
peace.” 8 4
Formerly the oceans had made difficult any attack against the
United States, but the “coming of aircraft has greatly modified this
isolation on account of the great range and speed which these agents
of communication are developing.” The heart of the nation’s war po-
tential lay in a triangle marked by Bangor, Norfolk, and Chicago.85
The complex functioning of that area was so delicately balanced as to
be highly vulnerable to air attack. Bombers could paralyze transporta-
tion by hitting a few chokepoints, could render governmental and in-
dustrial centers impotent: “A few shells, gas, explosive or incendiary,
landed in Manhattan would cause a complete evacuation.” 8 0 Disrupt
the tightly integrated activities of that vital triangle, and “resistance
is no longer possible and capitulation is the outcome.” 8 7
Even in the air age geography favored the United States; it was
far less open to air attack than European nations. But its immunity,
only relative, was steadily diminishing with improved performance of
aircraft. At first Mitchell was greatly concerned with the possibility
of carrier-borne attacks against America once that fast “floating air-
dromes” had been adapted to the use of bombers. His belief, however,
in the inherent superiority of land-based over carrier-based or float
planes and the increasing range of the former made them appear the
chief threat. In 1925 Mitchell pointed out that England could trans-
port aircraft to the St. Lawrence area whence they could menace the
whole of the vital triangle; in 1927 he was claiming that parts of
that region could be attacked directly from His main con-
cern, however, was with the northern approaches to the American
continent. Airplanes already in service could easily cross the North At-
lantic, staging from island to island with no overwater flight of more
than 400 miles. In the North Pacific only the narrow Bering Strait
separated Siberia from Alaska, and farther south the Aleutians con-
stituted a natural avenue of approach. Eventually, he thought, aircraft
would “follow the meridians straight over the top of the earth.”
Against a waterborne attack an efficient air force would be the
cheapest form of protection; against the new threat it was the only
defense. Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best be held to a minimum
by aggressive air action, and U.S. aviation should be organized ac-
cordingly. Defensive air units, chiefly pursuit, should be assigned for
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