“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 26-38
26. Ibid., pp. 271-72 and 287-90; 5 1 . Ibid., p. 88.
27. AAFHS-25, pp. 56-58.
28. Report of the Secretary of W a r ,
1921 (Washington, 1921), pp. 183 ff.; W a r , 1931 (Washingon, 1931)v P. 38.
Report of the Secretary of W a r , 19.22
(Washington, 19221,p. 163.
29. Report of the S I W , 1922, p. 261.
30. Zbid.
31. AAFHS-25, pp. 60-61. See also
text in N e w York T m e s , 19 Oct. 1923.
32. AAFHS-25, p. 62.
33. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 29399.
34. AAFHS-25, pp. 63-64.
35. 1bid.j pp. 65-67;Mitchell, Winged
36. AAFHS-25, pp. 62-63.
37. TO the Lampert Committee, 1935-43,pp. 4-6.
Patrick advocated a separate air force, 61. pp. 6-8.
not for the present but to be formed
after five or ten years. (Lampert Com-
mittee, Hearing, p. 533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of intimidation were
denied by interested authorities but seem
to have been well founded. (See Lampert
Committee, Hearing, passim and espe-
cially pp. 1667,1829,2377.)
39. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 30e317.
40. Ibid., pp. 318-20.
41. Ibid., chaps. 12-13.
4’. p’ 33‘, quoting New
43. AAFHS-25, pp. 68-69.
44. Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 2.
45. s. Doc. 18 (69th Cong.7 1st sess.).
See also text in N e w York Times, 3 Dec.
‘925.
46. H. Report 1653 (68th Cong., 2d
sess.); contents analyzed in N e w York
Times, 14 Dec. 1925.
Mitchell, Winged Defense, pp. 73-75. 52. War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931;Annual Report of the Chief
Of Staff, in Report of the Secretfly O f
53. AAFHS-25, PP. 91-92.
54. Ibid., p. 93.
55. Baker Board, Final Report, 18
56.]bid., pp, 18-19.
57. Ibid., p. 75.
58.AAFHS-25, pp. 96-98.
59. Ibid., pp. 98-99.T h e reorganiza-
tion was authorized by AGO letter of
31 December 1934.
60.AAF Historical Study No. 10,
Organization of the Army Air Arm,
July 1934.
Defense, p. XIX.
62.‘bid., PP. 8-15.
63.Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 445.
favoring the Depament Of Ddense. 64. Maj. Warren R, Carter, AC, Em-
ployment of
1938.
65. Howard E. Coffin, quoted in
A.W. Sweetser, The American Air serv-
ice, p. 79.
66. Mitchell, “Our Army’s Air Serv-
ice,” American Review of Reviews,
LXII (Sept. 1920),pp. 281-90.
~i~ F ~ ~ ~ ~I2
67.Ibid.
68.Mitchell, Our Air Force: The
Keystone of National Defense, p. 12.
69.Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” World‘s W o r k , XXXVIII (Aug.
rg19), p. 365.
70. Mitchell, ‘(our h m y ’ s Air Serv-
ice;* lot. tit.
71. Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” lot. tit.
72. H.A. Jones, T h e W a r in the
Air, VI, 136.
73. Ibid.
74. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 148-50.
75. J.J. Pershin& MY Experiences in
76.Mitchell, Our Air Force, p. 55.
77. Ibid., Introduction, p. xxii.
Evening Post.
47. AAFHS-25, pp. 73-77.
48. Public No. 446 (69th Cong., in 44
Stat. 780ff.).
49. AAFHS-25, p. 83. The Baker
Board’s Final Report, page 7, laid the
blame on Congress.
the World W a r , 11, 337.
50. AAFHS-25, p. 8s.
67 3