“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 26-38
26. Ibid., pp. 271-72 and 287-90; 5 1 . Ibid., p. 88.
27. AAFHS-25, pp. 56-58.
28. Report of the Secretary of W a r ,
1921 (Washington, 1921), pp. 183 ff.; W a r , 1931 (Washingon, 1931)v P. 38.
Report of the Secretary of W a r , 19.22
(Washington, 19221,p. 163.
29. Report of the S I W , 1922, p. 261.
30. Zbid.
31. AAFHS-25, pp. 60-61. See also
text in N e w York T m e s , 19 Oct. 1923.
32. AAFHS-25, p. 62.
33. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 29399.
34. AAFHS-25, pp. 63-64.
35. 1bid.j pp. 65-67;Mitchell, Winged
36. AAFHS-25, pp. 62-63.
37. TO the Lampert Committee, 1935-43,pp. 4-6.
Patrick advocated a separate air force, 61. pp. 6-8.
not for the present but to be formed
after five or ten years. (Lampert Com-
mittee, Hearing, p. 533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of intimidation were
denied by interested authorities but seem
to have been well founded. (See Lampert
Committee, Hearing, passim and espe-
cially pp. 1667,1829,2377.)
39. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 30e317.
40. Ibid., pp. 318-20.
41. Ibid., chaps. 12-13.
4’. p’ 33‘, quoting New
43. AAFHS-25, pp. 68-69.
44. Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 2.
45. s. Doc. 18 (69th Cong.7 1st sess.).
See also text in N e w York Times, 3 Dec.
‘925.
46. H. Report 1653 (68th Cong., 2d
sess.); contents analyzed in N e w York
Times, 14 Dec. 1925.
Mitchell, Winged Defense, pp. 73-75. 52. War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931;Annual Report of the Chief
Of Staff, in Report of the Secretfly O f
53. AAFHS-25, PP. 91-92.
54. Ibid., p. 93.
55. Baker Board, Final Report, 18
56.]bid., pp, 18-19.
57. Ibid., p. 75.
58.AAFHS-25, pp. 96-98.
59. Ibid., pp. 98-99.T h e reorganiza-
tion was authorized by AGO letter of
31 December 1934.
60.AAF Historical Study No. 10,
Organization of the Army Air Arm,
July 1934.
Defense, p. XIX.
62.‘bid., PP. 8-15.
63.Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 445.
favoring the Depament Of Ddense. 64. Maj. Warren R, Carter, AC, Em-
ployment of
1938.
65. Howard E. Coffin, quoted in
A.W. Sweetser, The American Air serv-
ice, p. 79.
66. Mitchell, “Our Army’s Air Serv-
ice,” American Review of Reviews,
LXII (Sept. 1920),pp. 281-90.
~i~ F ~ ~ ~ ~I2
67.Ibid.
68.Mitchell, Our Air Force: The
Keystone of National Defense, p. 12.
69.Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” World‘s W o r k , XXXVIII (Aug.
rg19), p. 365.
70. Mitchell, ‘(our h m y ’ s Air Serv-
ice;* lot. tit.
71. Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” lot. tit.
72. H.A. Jones, T h e W a r in the
Air, VI, 136.
73. Ibid.
74. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 148-50.
75. J.J. Pershin& MY Experiences in
76.Mitchell, Our Air Force, p. 55.
77. Ibid., Introduction, p. xxii.
Evening Post.
47. AAFHS-25, pp. 73-77.
48. Public No. 446 (69th Cong., in 44
Stat. 780ff.).
49. AAFHS-25, p. 83. The Baker
Board’s Final Report, page 7, laid the
blame on Congress.
the World W a r , 11, 337.
50. AAFHS-25, p. 8s.
67 3