“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 26-38
26. Ibid., pp. 271-72 and 287-90; 5 1 . Ibid., p. 88.
27. AAFHS-25, pp. 56-58.
28. Report of the Secretary of W a r ,
1921 (Washington, 1921), pp. 183 ff.; W a r , 1931 (Washingon, 1931)v P. 38.
Report of the Secretary of W a r , 19.22
(Washington, 19221,p. 163.
29. Report of the S I W , 1922, p. 261.
30. Zbid.
31. AAFHS-25, pp. 60-61. See also
text in N e w York T m e s , 19 Oct. 1923.
32. AAFHS-25, p. 62.
33. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 29399.
34. AAFHS-25, pp. 63-64.
35. 1bid.j pp. 65-67;Mitchell, Winged
36. AAFHS-25, pp. 62-63.
37. TO the Lampert Committee, 1935-43,pp. 4-6.
Patrick advocated a separate air force, 61. pp. 6-8.
not for the present but to be formed
after five or ten years. (Lampert Com-
mittee, Hearing, p. 533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of intimidation were
denied by interested authorities but seem
to have been well founded. (See Lampert
Committee, Hearing, passim and espe-
cially pp. 1667,1829,2377.)
39. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 30e317.
40. Ibid., pp. 318-20.
41. Ibid., chaps. 12-13.
4’. p’ 33‘, quoting New
43. AAFHS-25, pp. 68-69.
44. Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 2.
45. s. Doc. 18 (69th Cong.7 1st sess.).
See also text in N e w York Times, 3 Dec.
‘925.
46. H. Report 1653 (68th Cong., 2d
sess.); contents analyzed in N e w York
Times, 14 Dec. 1925.
Mitchell, Winged Defense, pp. 73-75. 52. War Department Press Release,
9 Jan. 1931;Annual Report of the Chief
Of Staff, in Report of the Secretfly O f
53. AAFHS-25, PP. 91-92.
54. Ibid., p. 93.
55. Baker Board, Final Report, 18
56.]bid., pp, 18-19.
57. Ibid., p. 75.
58.AAFHS-25, pp. 96-98.
59. Ibid., pp. 98-99.T h e reorganiza-
tion was authorized by AGO letter of
31 December 1934.
60.AAF Historical Study No. 10,
Organization of the Army Air Arm,
July 1934.
Defense, p. XIX.
62.‘bid., PP. 8-15.
63.Morrow Board, Hearings, p. 445.
favoring the Depament Of Ddense. 64. Maj. Warren R, Carter, AC, Em-
ployment of
1938.
65. Howard E. Coffin, quoted in
A.W. Sweetser, The American Air serv-
ice, p. 79.
66. Mitchell, “Our Army’s Air Serv-
ice,” American Review of Reviews,
LXII (Sept. 1920),pp. 281-90.
~i~ F ~ ~ ~ ~I2
67.Ibid.
68.Mitchell, Our Air Force: The
Keystone of National Defense, p. 12.
69.Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” World‘s W o r k , XXXVIII (Aug.
rg19), p. 365.
70. Mitchell, ‘(our h m y ’ s Air Serv-
ice;* lot. tit.
71. Mitchell, “The Air Service at St.
Mihiel,” lot. tit.
72. H.A. Jones, T h e W a r in the
Air, VI, 136.
73. Ibid.
74. Levine, Mitchell, pp. 148-50.
75. J.J. Pershin& MY Experiences in
76.Mitchell, Our Air Force, p. 55.
77. Ibid., Introduction, p. xxii.
Evening Post.
47. AAFHS-25, pp. 73-77.
48. Public No. 446 (69th Cong., in 44
Stat. 780ff.).
49. AAFHS-25, p. 83. The Baker
Board’s Final Report, page 7, laid the
blame on Congress.
the World W a r , 11, 337.
50. AAFHS-25, p. 8s.
67 3