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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I General Eaker made some interesting personal observations on the problems uncovered by this initial combat T h e crews were enthusiastic and alert, but nonchalant to the point of being blasC. Possibly it had all been too easy, but confidence was a good fault in a bomber crew. Crew drills, especially in the handling of the oxygen equipment, appeared to be indicated, and air discipline needed improvement. A better, tighter defensive formation would offer more protection against enemy fighters-not that enemy action had been a serious factor in this instance. T h e critical items in missions of this sort General Eaker considered to be the split-second timing for rendezvous with the fighter escort (the fighters in this case had been a few minutes late), navigation to the target (there would not always be weather so fine that the target could be seen for ten miles), train- ing of bombardiers (the Sotteville yard was, after all, considerably larger than the proverbial pickle barrel), pilotage of such a high order that a tight yet maneuverable formation might be flown with the shortest possible level run on the target (anything less would simply court disaster from flak and fighter opposition, both of which might be expected to improve materially), and, finally, accurate gunnery. O n the matter of escort, General Eaker was unwilling to say that the B-I 7 could make deep penetrations into German-held territory without cover, although it was apparent from the Rouen mission that German fighters would approach the bombers gingerl~.~’General Spaatz shared Eaker’s caution on this point. In the cable of I 8 August, to which reference has been made above, Spaatz asserted that Amer- ican bombers would not be sent indiscriminately into Germany and that depth of penetration would increase only as experience dictated. Meanwhile, pending determined enemy fighter attacks, which would undoubtedly soon materialize, no definite conclusions could be reached regarding the feasibility of bomber attacks unsupported by fighter^.^ * O n the day after this first mission executed by his bombers, General Eaker received the following message from Air Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF Bomber Command: “Congratulations from all ranks of Bomber Command on the highly successful completion of the first all American raid by the big fellows on German occupied territory in Europe. Yankee Doodle certainly went to town and can stick yet another well-deserved feather in his cap.” 32 665
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