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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
General Eaker made some interesting personal observations on the
problems uncovered by this initial combat T h e crews were
enthusiastic and alert, but nonchalant to the point of being blasC.
Possibly it had all been too easy, but confidence was a good fault in a
bomber crew. Crew drills, especially in the handling of the oxygen
equipment, appeared to be indicated, and air discipline needed
improvement. A better, tighter defensive formation would offer more
protection against enemy fighters-not that enemy action had been
a serious factor in this instance. T h e critical items in missions of this
sort General Eaker considered to be the split-second timing for
rendezvous with the fighter escort (the fighters in this case had been
a few minutes late), navigation to the target (there would not always
be weather so fine that the target could be seen for ten miles), train-
ing of bombardiers (the Sotteville yard was, after all, considerably
larger than the proverbial pickle barrel), pilotage of such a high order
that a tight yet maneuverable formation might be flown with the
shortest possible level run on the target (anything less would simply
court disaster from flak and fighter opposition, both of which might
be expected to improve materially), and, finally, accurate gunnery.
O n the matter of escort, General Eaker was unwilling to say that
the B-I 7 could make deep penetrations into German-held territory
without cover, although it was apparent from the Rouen mission that
German fighters would approach the bombers gingerl~.~’General
Spaatz shared Eaker’s caution on this point. In the cable of I 8 August,
to which reference has been made above, Spaatz asserted that Amer-
ican bombers would not be sent indiscriminately into Germany and
that depth of penetration would increase only as experience dictated.
Meanwhile, pending determined enemy fighter attacks, which would
undoubtedly soon materialize, no definite conclusions could be
reached regarding the feasibility of bomber attacks unsupported by
fighter^.^ *
O n the day after this first mission executed by his bombers, General
Eaker received the following message from Air Marshal Sir Arthur T.
Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF Bomber Command:
“Congratulations from all ranks of Bomber Command on the highly
successful completion of the first all American raid by the big fellows
on German occupied territory in Europe. Yankee Doodle certainly
went to town and can stick yet another well-deserved feather in his
cap.” 32
665

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