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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 with 1,Ioo-lb. bombs intended for the locomotive workshop; the rest carried 600-lb. missiles earmarked for the Buddicum The bombing was fairly accurate for a first effort. Approximately half of the bombs fell in the general target area. One of the aiming points was hit, and several bombs burst within a radius of 1,500 feet. Those intended for the other aiming point fell mostly about 2,000 feet to the Fortunately, the yard and adjacent facilities pre- sented a large target, so that even technically inaccurate bombing might still be effective. Nevertheless, it was surprisingly good bomb- ing. And it was effective enough, considering the small size of the attacking force. Direct hits were scored on two large transshipment sheds in the center of the marshalling yard, and about ten of the twenty-four tracks on the sidings were damaged. A quantity of roll- ing stock was destroyed, damaged, or derailed. As it happened, activity in the yard was not at its peak when the attack occurred, or destruction of rolling stock might have been much greater. Damage to the tracks no doubt interfered with the flow of traffic, but a sufficient number remained undamaged to deal efficiently with the relatively low-pressure traffic then moving through the yard. The bottlenecks a t each end of the sidings were not damaged. The locomotive work- shop received one direct hit which probably slowed up the working of locomotives and other rolling stock in and out of the building quite apart from the constructional damage resulting from blast.28 Despite the inconvenience which this attack undoubtedly caused the enemy, it was clear that a much larger force would be required to do lasting damage to a target of this But for the time being, the extent of the damage inflicted was less important than the relative accuracy of the bombing. Important also was the fact that the bombers, both of the attacking and the diversionary force, came through with no losses and with a minimum of damage. Enemy opposition had been slight. Antiaircraft fire was observed at two places, but only two planes sustained dam- age, and that slight. Fighter opposition was negligible. Three Me- 109’s attacked the formation, and several others put in a silent appearance. Of those attacking, one was claimed as damaged by fire from the B-17’s. T h e bomber crews received no injury at all from enemy action, the only casualties having occurred when, on the way home, one plane hit a pigeon and the shattered glass from the nose of the bomber slightly injured the bombardier and navigator.2s 664
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