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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
with 1,Ioo-lb. bombs intended for the locomotive workshop; the rest
carried 600-lb. missiles earmarked for the Buddicum
The bombing was fairly accurate for a first effort. Approximately
half of the bombs fell in the general target area. One of the aiming
points was hit, and several bombs burst within a radius of 1,500 feet.
Those intended for the other aiming point fell mostly about 2,000
feet to the Fortunately, the yard and adjacent facilities pre-
sented a large target, so that even technically inaccurate bombing
might still be effective. Nevertheless, it was surprisingly good bomb-
ing. And it was effective enough, considering the small size of the
attacking force. Direct hits were scored on two large transshipment
sheds in the center of the marshalling yard, and about ten of the
twenty-four tracks on the sidings were damaged. A quantity of roll-
ing stock was destroyed, damaged, or derailed. As it happened,
activity in the yard was not at its peak when the attack occurred, or
destruction of rolling stock might have been much greater. Damage to
the tracks no doubt interfered with the flow of traffic, but a sufficient
number remained undamaged to deal efficiently with the relatively
low-pressure traffic then moving through the yard. The bottlenecks
a t each end of the sidings were not damaged. The locomotive work-
shop received one direct hit which probably slowed up the working
of locomotives and other rolling stock in and out of the building
quite apart from the constructional damage resulting from blast.28
Despite the inconvenience which this attack undoubtedly caused the
enemy, it was clear that a much larger force would be required to do
lasting damage to a target of this But for the time being, the
extent of the damage inflicted was less important than the relative
accuracy of the bombing.
Important also was the fact that the bombers, both of the attacking
and the diversionary force, came through with no losses and with a
minimum of damage. Enemy opposition had been slight. Antiaircraft
fire was observed at two places, but only two planes sustained dam-
age, and that slight. Fighter opposition was negligible. Three Me-
109’s attacked the formation, and several others put in a silent
appearance. Of those attacking, one was claimed as damaged by fire
from the B-17’s. T h e bomber crews received no injury at all from
enemy action, the only casualties having occurred when, on the way
home, one plane hit a pigeon and the shattered glass from the nose of
the bomber slightly injured the bombardier and navigator.2s
664

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