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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
the night offensive, it would be unfair to the American flyers to send
them into a type of action for which, according to British experience,
they were not equipped. Masefield found the answer to this seem-
ingly insoluble problem of using bombers that were suited neither to
day nor to night operations by advocating that they be sent on patrol
missions over the Atlantic submarine and shipping lanes.
The appearance of this article by one who presumably reflected
opinion in a t least some official British quarters gave rise to a certain
amount of concern in AAF Headquarters. The following day General
Arnold, on receiving the London dispatch which quoted the Mase-
field article, wired General Spaatz for a statement of the facts in the
case as he saw them.z1 General Spaatz was happily spared from having
to resort to tedious and a t best none too convincing apologetics, for,
as a result of the mission against Rouen on 17 August, he was able for
the first time to offer a combat report, and a reasonably good one a t
that.
The attack on Rouen had, he wired on 18 August, far exceeded in
accuracy any previous high-altitude bombing in the European theater
by German or Allied aircraft. Moreover, it was his understanding that
the results justified “our belief” in the feasibility of daylight bombing.
As for the B-17, it was suitable in speed, armament, armor, and bomb
load for the task a t hand. H e would not, he asserted, exchange it for
any British bomber in production.**
The target for this first heavy bombing raid was the Sotteville
marshalling yard, one of the largest and most active in northern
France. Concentrations of more than 2,000 freight cars had been
photographed there. It possessed for the enemy a twofold impor-
tance: it was a focal point for traffic to and from the Channel ports
and the west of France, and it comprised extensive repair installations,
including a large locomotive depot and the Buddicum rolling stock
repair shops. The specific aiming points were the locomotive work-
shops and the Buddicum s h o p ~ . ~ ~
The twelve B-17E aircraft dispatched to the target enjoyed strong
support from RAF fighters. Four RAF squadrons of Spitfire IX’s
provided close cover for the attacking planes, flying with them to
the target area. Five RAF squadrons of Spitfire V’s gave withdrawal
support. Visibility was excellent and all twelve planes attacked the
target, dropping a total of 36,900 pounds of general-purpose bombs
from a height of 23,000 feet. Three of the bombers had been loaded
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.