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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Seattle”8 pages
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I the night offensive, it would be unfair to the American flyers to send them into a type of action for which, according to British experience, they were not equipped. Masefield found the answer to this seem- ingly insoluble problem of using bombers that were suited neither to day nor to night operations by advocating that they be sent on patrol missions over the Atlantic submarine and shipping lanes. The appearance of this article by one who presumably reflected opinion in a t least some official British quarters gave rise to a certain amount of concern in AAF Headquarters. The following day General Arnold, on receiving the London dispatch which quoted the Mase- field article, wired General Spaatz for a statement of the facts in the case as he saw them.z1 General Spaatz was happily spared from having to resort to tedious and a t best none too convincing apologetics, for, as a result of the mission against Rouen on 17 August, he was able for the first time to offer a combat report, and a reasonably good one a t that. The attack on Rouen had, he wired on 18 August, far exceeded in accuracy any previous high-altitude bombing in the European theater by German or Allied aircraft. Moreover, it was his understanding that the results justified “our belief” in the feasibility of daylight bombing. As for the B-17, it was suitable in speed, armament, armor, and bomb load for the task a t hand. H e would not, he asserted, exchange it for any British bomber in production.** The target for this first heavy bombing raid was the Sotteville marshalling yard, one of the largest and most active in northern France. Concentrations of more than 2,000 freight cars had been photographed there. It possessed for the enemy a twofold impor- tance: it was a focal point for traffic to and from the Channel ports and the west of France, and it comprised extensive repair installations, including a large locomotive depot and the Buddicum rolling stock repair shops. The specific aiming points were the locomotive work- shops and the Buddicum s h o p ~ . ~ ~ The twelve B-17E aircraft dispatched to the target enjoyed strong support from RAF fighters. Four RAF squadrons of Spitfire IX’s provided close cover for the attacking planes, flying with them to the target area. Five RAF squadrons of Spitfire V’s gave withdrawal support. Visibility was excellent and all twelve planes attacked the target, dropping a total of 36,900 pounds of general-purpose bombs from a height of 23,000 feet. Three of the bombers had been loaded 663
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