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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
the night offensive, it would be unfair to the American flyers to send
them into a type of action for which, according to British experience,
they were not equipped. Masefield found the answer to this seem-
ingly insoluble problem of using bombers that were suited neither to
day nor to night operations by advocating that they be sent on patrol
missions over the Atlantic submarine and shipping lanes.
The appearance of this article by one who presumably reflected
opinion in a t least some official British quarters gave rise to a certain
amount of concern in AAF Headquarters. The following day General
Arnold, on receiving the London dispatch which quoted the Mase-
field article, wired General Spaatz for a statement of the facts in the
case as he saw them.z1 General Spaatz was happily spared from having
to resort to tedious and a t best none too convincing apologetics, for,
as a result of the mission against Rouen on 17 August, he was able for
the first time to offer a combat report, and a reasonably good one a t
that.
The attack on Rouen had, he wired on 18 August, far exceeded in
accuracy any previous high-altitude bombing in the European theater
by German or Allied aircraft. Moreover, it was his understanding that
the results justified “our belief” in the feasibility of daylight bombing.
As for the B-17, it was suitable in speed, armament, armor, and bomb
load for the task a t hand. H e would not, he asserted, exchange it for
any British bomber in production.**
The target for this first heavy bombing raid was the Sotteville
marshalling yard, one of the largest and most active in northern
France. Concentrations of more than 2,000 freight cars had been
photographed there. It possessed for the enemy a twofold impor-
tance: it was a focal point for traffic to and from the Channel ports
and the west of France, and it comprised extensive repair installations,
including a large locomotive depot and the Buddicum rolling stock
repair shops. The specific aiming points were the locomotive work-
shops and the Buddicum s h o p ~ . ~ ~
The twelve B-17E aircraft dispatched to the target enjoyed strong
support from RAF fighters. Four RAF squadrons of Spitfire IX’s
provided close cover for the attacking planes, flying with them to
the target area. Five RAF squadrons of Spitfire V’s gave withdrawal
support. Visibility was excellent and all twelve planes attacked the
target, dropping a total of 36,900 pounds of general-purpose bombs
from a height of 23,000 feet. Three of the bombers had been loaded
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