Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
morale having worn thin from repeated “dry runs,” stretches of bad
weather, and a frustrated desire to have at the enemy, needed badly
the stimulus that a successful mission would give them. Generals and
staff officers, conscious of public impatience at home for action in the
European theater and aware especially of the long-range strategic
planning that hinged on the successful initiation of daylight bombard-
ment, watched with intense interest not unmixed with concern. As
for the press, its representatives accurately sensed a good story in the
making.’*
At 1539 hours the twelve attacking planes were in the air, with
General Eaker riding in the Yankee Doodle, lead bomber of the sec-
ond flight of six. For over three hours privates and generals waited
at the base for the return of the Fortresses, sharing alike the common
suspense. Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower
spotted a cluster of specks to the west of the airdrome-twelve of
them. At exactly 1900 the first B-17 settled down on the runway,
followed by the others. Pilots and mechanics swarmed out to meet the
incoming crews like, as one observer put it, the crowds a t a football
rally. Soon the word passed around: all bombs dropped on or close to
the target, no battle casualties, insignificant flak damage-in general, a
successful mi~sion.~’
This first combat mission flown by the Fortresses of VIII Bomber
Command could not have been more fortunately timed. Considerable
“polite doubt” had been expressed in British circles during the summer
of 1942 regarding the potentialities of the American bombers, and on
16 August, Peter Masefield, air correspondent to the Sunday Times,
gave voice to an opinion which left little doubt and which bristled
with “plain speaking.” ‘ O H e spoke of British satisfaction a t the pros-
pect of American aid in the bombing of Germany. But he also made
it perfectly plain that he considered the B-17 and B-24 quite unsuited
to the job of bombing over heavily defended enemy territory:
“American heavy bombers-the latest Fortresses and Liberators-are
fine flying machines, but not suited for bombing in Europe. Their
bombs and bomb-loads are small, their armour and armament are not
up to the standard now found necessary and their speeds are low.”
It was not simply that the American bombers could not perform the
day bombing mission for which they were being prepared. They were
likewise unsuited to night operations over Germany, and, in spite of
the general desire in the British Isles to see these aircraft take part in
662

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.