Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 370 …Reichers took a route by way of Cairo across central Africa, the South Atlantic, and up…
  • p. 371 …I 0,000 miles separated Miami from Cairo.23An airplane leaving southern Florida traveled 4,000…
  • p. 372 …of Africa and across central Africa to Cairo. Ferrying operations over the South Atlantic route had…
  • p. 375 …Takoradi following the completion of deliveries to Cairo, and for hauling critical items of supply east…
  • p. 378 …7 December the service was extended to Cairo and beyond.54 Before operations could begin, Pan…
  • p. 379 …Maxwell had been established at Cairo on I 3 September 1941, with responsibilities similar to those…
  • p. 380 …to the opening of a service to Cairo over the South Atlantic route. Two survey flights…
  • p. 381 …R Y I N G Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important military…
  • p. 382 …of the bombers departed Bolling Field for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across…
  • p. 385 …Lend-lease planes for Russia were flown through Cairo to Basra or to Tehran, where they…
  • p. 387 …for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more exposed to attack, Takoradi and…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 390 …24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The first step was to establish a ferrying…
  • p. 391 …parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from…
  • p. 395 …assembled and then ferried across Africa to Cairo. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the…
  • p. 407 …Harbor, first to Britain and later to Cairo, had been little more than courier services and…
  • p. 411 …from their normal operations between Washington and Cairo and sent to the Far East. A plan…
  • p. 412 …Kester-the pilot who had inaugurated the Washington- Cairo transport service in November-was lost off…
  • p. 413 …In February, Transcontinental & Western Air began operating a shuttle service from Washington to Cairo, using two…
  • p. 629 …5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the…
  • p. 630 …one group of heavies set up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial…
  • p. 778 …CM-IN, MA Cairo to M E I D 65. CM-IN, London (Brett) to Trip…
  • p. 779 …1942; CM- IN, Cairo (Fellen) to T A G (Adler for Arnold), 8754 Amseg, 3 Feb…
  • p. 786 …1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb. IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T…
  • p. 830 …BOLERO BR CAA C/AAF C/AC CAIRO C/AS C A T F CCRC CCS…
  • p. 844 …5 Cagayan (Mindanao), 219 Cagayan Valley, 208 Cairo, 3 1 ~ 2 1 , 325-26, 328-29…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
then, for example, could it be determined whether the additional
armament and armor added to the B-17 in order to protect it from
fighter attack would, by slowing it down, render it correspondingly
vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. This problem was only one of many
a t this early date facing the exponents of daylight bombing. In each,
a delicate balance had to be sought between the requirements of
defense against flak, defense against fighters, and accuracy of bomb-
ing. High-altitude flying was believed essential for purposes of avoid-
ing flak, yet it was agreed that the higher the altitude the lower would
be the degree of accuracy possible in bombing. Under ideal condi-
tions, bombing by individual planes or by elements appeared to offer
the best chances of accuracy, yet the mutual fire support provided by
a relatively large group of bombers would aid greatly in defending
the bombers from fighter attack. These and other dilemmas, their
outlines as yet only dimly discernible, were to govern the tactical
development of the American bomber force." And in each case the
nature of the compromise adopted could be determined only on the
basis of experience gained in combat.
O n the night of 9 August, a wave of excitement swept the 97th
Group. An order had been received alerting the crews for a combat
mission. Ammunition was loaded and preparations made for the big
event. But the weather refused to co-operate, and the mission was
canceled. Weather conditions-which were to provide one of the
gravest obstacles to daylight precision bombing-continued unfavor-
able for the next week. Finally, on the night of 16 August, an alert
was again called. This time the weather held."
Rouen-Sotteville No. I , 17 August 1942
The mission for the 17th was to be small, involving in all only
eighteen bombers. Twelve were to attack the marshalling yard at
Rouen, flying under heavy fighter cover provided by RAF Spitfire
squadrons, while the remainder flew a diversionary sweep along the
coast. But, small as it was, this mission commanded the attention of
both American and British airmen as few larger undertakings had
done. General Spaatz was a t Grafton Underwood to watch the For-
tresses take off, and with him were a number of staff officers from
both the Eighth Air Force and the RAF. With him also were some
thirty members of the U.S. and British press. Everyone shared in the
excitement and tension of the moment. The crews of the 97th, their
66 I

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.