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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 537 …of Air Staff, Plans, Col. Orvil A. Anderson, had in preparation a study of the possibility…
  • p. 757 …Cole O d l e Anderson, CaPt. Ball, Capt. Moss, and himself. The im- portance of…
  • p. 770 …AFSHO files. 9. Lt. Col. O.A. Anderson, AWPD, Air Forces Estimate of the Situation, 1…
  • p. 797 …for C/AS from Col. O.A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans, 25 June 1942. General Marshall…
  • p. 812 …for Col. George from Maj. S.E. Anderson, Research Regarding Bomber-Fighter Combats in Europe, 1…
  • p. 818 …AC/S, OPD from Col. O.A. Anderson, 10 July 1942. 197. Key Plan for the…
  • p. 840 …5 1 2 Andaman Is., 500, 503 Anderson, Col. 0. A., 472 Andes, 639 Andres, Pvt…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
then, for example, could it be determined whether the additional
armament and armor added to the B-17 in order to protect it from
fighter attack would, by slowing it down, render it correspondingly
vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. This problem was only one of many
a t this early date facing the exponents of daylight bombing. In each,
a delicate balance had to be sought between the requirements of
defense against flak, defense against fighters, and accuracy of bomb-
ing. High-altitude flying was believed essential for purposes of avoid-
ing flak, yet it was agreed that the higher the altitude the lower would
be the degree of accuracy possible in bombing. Under ideal condi-
tions, bombing by individual planes or by elements appeared to offer
the best chances of accuracy, yet the mutual fire support provided by
a relatively large group of bombers would aid greatly in defending
the bombers from fighter attack. These and other dilemmas, their
outlines as yet only dimly discernible, were to govern the tactical
development of the American bomber force." And in each case the
nature of the compromise adopted could be determined only on the
basis of experience gained in combat.
O n the night of 9 August, a wave of excitement swept the 97th
Group. An order had been received alerting the crews for a combat
mission. Ammunition was loaded and preparations made for the big
event. But the weather refused to co-operate, and the mission was
canceled. Weather conditions-which were to provide one of the
gravest obstacles to daylight precision bombing-continued unfavor-
able for the next week. Finally, on the night of 16 August, an alert
was again called. This time the weather held."
Rouen-Sotteville No. I , 17 August 1942
The mission for the 17th was to be small, involving in all only
eighteen bombers. Twelve were to attack the marshalling yard at
Rouen, flying under heavy fighter cover provided by RAF Spitfire
squadrons, while the remainder flew a diversionary sweep along the
coast. But, small as it was, this mission commanded the attention of
both American and British airmen as few larger undertakings had
done. General Spaatz was a t Grafton Underwood to watch the For-
tresses take off, and with him were a number of staff officers from
both the Eighth Air Force and the RAF. With him also were some
thirty members of the U.S. and British press. Everyone shared in the
excitement and tension of the moment. The crews of the 97th, their
66 I

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.