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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
least the enemy had been engaged and blows exchanged, and it did
not matter a great deal that the enemy had distinctly the better of the
trade.
O n 12 July 1942 the 15th Squadron executed another six-plane
attack, this time on the Abbeville-Drucat airdrome. Out of well-
founded respect for German flak defenses, this second daylight mis-
sion was carried out a t medium altitude (8,500 feet) rather than at
low level. All aircraft returned without casualties, although two of
them suffered some flak damage. During the next few weeks the unit
received its own planes, A-~o's,and was engaged mainly in putting
the new equipment into operational shape."
T h e Heavy Bombers Complete Their Training
Meanwhile, during the first two weeks of August, the heavy
bomber crews of the 97th Group, now under Col. Frank A. Arm-
strong, Jr., were rapidly overcoming the handicaps under which they
had begun their training. The training program progressed so well
that by the 15th of that month twenty-four crews were declared
available for daylight bombing mission^.'^ In addition to an improved
grasp of such essentials as gunnery, bombing, navigation, and high-
altitude formation flying, these crews were learning their trade in
other important respects-how to use oxygen as an aid rather than as
something to be feared, how to guard against frostbite in the bitter
cold at extreme altitudes, how to evade enemy fighters by skidding,
corkscrewing, undulating, and turning into attacks, and how to avoid
flak by changes in direction and altitude. Practice missions were con-
ducted in co-operation with RAF Fighter Command for the purpose
of giving the bomber pilots experience in making exact rendezvous
with their fighter escort. These practice operations also revealed a
great deal about the performance of the B- I 7 and its equipment under
conditions more nearly like those to be expected in combat over
northwestern Europe than any yet encountered. Barring some trouble
with the gun mechanism a t very high altitudes (the guns tended to
become stiff and heavy to operate in extremely low temperatures, and
sometimes failed to fire) and except for the fact that the B-17E lacked
the firepower straight ahead that characterized its other fields of fire,
the Fortress appeared c ~ m b a t - w o r t h y . ~ ~
Large question marks remained, of course, and were not likely to
be removed until the bombers were tested in actual combat. Not until
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